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Abstract 
Long-run per capita economic growth is driven by productivity growth. Major determinants of 
productivity are investments in education and research, and the intensity of competition on 
product markets. While these ideas have been incorporated into modern growth theories and 
tested in empirical analyses, they have not yet found their way to applied macroeconomic 
models used to forecast economic developments. In this paper, we discuss various options to 
include human capital, R&D and product market competition in a macroeconomic framework. 
We also study how policy can affect the decisions to build human capital or to perform research, 
and how competition policy impacts on macroeconomic outcomes. We finally sketch how these 
mechanisms can be implemented into the large models used at the Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis (CPB). 
 
Key words: Human capital, R&D, competition, applied macroeconomic models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Erik Canton, Bert Minne, Ate Nieuwenhuis, Bert Smid and Marc van der Steeg are with  the 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), Van Stolkweg 14, P.O. Box 80510, 2508 GM, 
The Hague. This paper was first published as CPB Document No. 91, July 2005. 
 Contents 
 
Preface............................................................................................................................................ i 
Summary.......................................................................................................................................ii 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
2.  Review of theories on productivity......................................................................................... 2 
2.1 Neoclassical growth theory.............................................................................................. 2 
2.2 Human capital.................................................................................................................. 3 
2.2.1  Human capital in a neoclassical framework........................................................... 3 
2.2.2  Human capital and endogenous growth ................................................................. 4 
2.2.3  Time to build human capital................................................................................... 5 
2.2.4  Human capital in an open economy ....................................................................... 6 
2.2.5  Human capital and technology adoption................................................................ 6 
2.2.6  Empirical relationship between human capital and economic growth................... 6 
2.3 Research and development............................................................................................. 10 
2.3.1 Conceptual  issues................................................................................................. 10 
2.3.2  R&D in a neoclassical framework........................................................................ 10 
2.3.3  R&D and endogenous growth.............................................................................. 11 
2.3.4  Time to research and develop............................................................................... 12 
2.3.5  Empirical relationship between R&D and economic growth............................... 13 
2.4 Product market competition........................................................................................... 14 
2.4.1  Competition in a framework with exogenous growth.......................................... 14 
2.4.2  Competition and endogenous growth................................................................... 16 
2.5 Interactions between human capital, R&D, and competition......................................... 17 
3.  Effects of government policy................................................................................................ 18 
3.1 Human capital................................................................................................................ 18 
3.1.1  Rationale for public intervention in education..................................................... 18 
3.1.2  Effects of education policy................................................................................... 20 
3.1.3 Conclusions.......................................................................................................... 24 
3.2 Research and development............................................................................................. 25 
3.2.1  Rationale for public intervention in research and development........................... 25 
3.2.2  Effects of R&D policy.......................................................................................... 28 
3.2.3 Conclusions.......................................................................................................... 35 
3.3 Product market competition........................................................................................... 35 
4.  Productivity in applied macroeconomic models................................................................... 37 
4.1 Applied macroeconomic models.................................................................................... 38 
4.2 Human capital................................................................................................................ 39 
4.2.1 CPB models.......................................................................................................... 39 
4.2.2 Other models........................................................................................................ 40 4.3 Research and development............................................................................................. 41 
4.3.1 CPB models.......................................................................................................... 41 
4.3.2 Other models........................................................................................................ 41 
4.4 Product market competition........................................................................................... 43 
4.4.1 CPB models.......................................................................................................... 43 
4.4.2 Other models........................................................................................................ 43 
5. Epilogue................................................................................................................................ 43 
References................................................................................................................................... 46 
 
 
 | i 
Preface 
he topic of economic growth is perhaps one of the most fundamental issues in 
macroeconomics. Important channels to raise living standards are the promotion of 
human capital formation (say, education), research and development and product market 
competition. While there is substantial literature on the determinants of productivity, such 
mechanisms are usually ignored in applied macroeconomic models because of a lack of 
quantitative knowledge. This study reviews the literature and sketches options to implement 
human capital, R&D, and competition in the CPB models. 
Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the Ministry of Economic Affairs and at the 
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, and at the Workshop on Economic Policy 
Modelling in Copenhagen. We would like to thank Piet Donselaar, Luuk Klomp, Stephan Raes 
(Ministry of Economic Affairs), André de Moor (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science), 
and Ben Geurts (Ministry of Finance) for constructive comments. We also thank Robert 
Haveman (University of Wisconsin - Madison) for discussion on external effects associated 
with education and human capital, and how these effects can be taken into account in 
macroeconomic analysis. Finally we thank Taco van Hoek, Free Huizinga, Richard Nahuis, 
Dinand Webbink, Henry van der Wiel, and other colleagues from CPB for their valuable inputs. 
This project is co-financed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and we would like to thank the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs for this financial support. 
This report should be seen as a position paper to explore the macroeconomic impact of 
productivity-drivers such as human capital, R&D, and product market competition. A lot more 
work is needed before we have sufficiently reliable quantitative results to use in our 
macroeconomic models. In parallel projects we already started to experiment with endogenous 
productivity in CPB models, and these efforts will be continued in future work. 
 
Henk Don 
Director, CPB 
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Summary 
n this paper, we try to bring the modern literature on productivity and the world of 
macroeconomic modelling in closer proximity. A country’s long-run per capita growth rate 
is driven by productivity growth. Major determinants of productivity are investments in 
education and research. Also the market structure in which firms are embedded is relevant, both 
for the decision to adopt an existing technology and to develop new technologies through 
research and development (R&D) efforts. While these ideas have been incorporated into modern 
growth theories and tested in empirical analyses, they have not yet found their way to the 
empirical macroeconomic or macroeconometric models used to analyse economic policy. 
Briefly, we propose a two-step strategy: 
•  The first step is to study the macroeconomic effects of human capital, R&D, and 
competition. This is the topic of Chapter 2. 
•  The second step is to study the link between policy and human capital, R&D, and 
competition. This is the topic of Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 4, we review if and how human capital, R&D, and market structure are considered in 
applied macroeconomic models used at CPB and other policy research institutes.  
Review of theories on productivity 
What is the macroeconomic impact of changes in human capital, R&D, or the intensity of 
product market competition? Chapter 2 explores the important mechanisms as proposed in the 
economic literature. Human capital can be introduced as an additional production factor, 
contributing to equilibrium production levels in a neoclassical growth model and to the balanced 
growth rate in an endogenous growth framework. Human capital can also play a productive role 
in terms of the absorption capacity to assimilate new technologies. Growth empirics indicate 
that an increase in average educational attainment of the population by one year increases long-
run per capita output by about 6%. If education is subject to decreasing returns, the impact on 
per capita output might be smaller in countries with high education levels such as the 
Netherlands. R&D can be introduced either as a separate production factor, or through its 
impact on total factor productivity. Empirical studies point out that R&D generates substantial 
returns, both in terms of innovation and through adoption of existing technologies. Finally, the 
impact of increased product market competition on macroeconomic performance can operate 
through two channels: improvements in static and dynamic efficiency. The potential gains from 
improved dynamic efficiency can be important, as innovation is increased. While increases in 
human capital, R&D, and product market competition can improve macroeconomic 
performance, it can take a long time before these benefits arrive, as for instance it takes time to 
build human capital. 
Effects of government policy 
How can policy affect the formation of human capital and R&D activity, and what is known 
about the relationship between competition policy and macroeconomic outcomes? We 
distinguish between human capital policies aimed at enrolment (a quantity indicator) and 
educational quality. Examples of enrolment policies are changes in the compulsory schooling 
age and financial aid to encourage higher education enrolment. Policies designed to improve 
educational quality include class size reductions and merit pay for teachers. Especially early 
childhood interventions have been found effective, both in terms of raising average years of 
education and improving student performance. R&D policies include subsidy programs to 
I HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | iii 
 
encourage private R&D, but also instruments to make better use of the existing knowledge base. 
Estimates on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies show substantial variation, and outcomes will 
depend on (country-) specific institutional arrangements. Finally, the literature on the 
macroeconomic impact of competition policy generally finds positive effects in terms of GDP 
or total factor productivity. Unfortunately, convincing policy evaluation studies are scarce, and 
little is known about the causal impact of these instruments. In the design of new policy, one 
could take into account the possibilities for a proper evaluation based on natural or controlled 
experiments. This is helpful to evaluate the causal impact of policy some time after its 
implementation (so-called ex post policy evaluation). Such a strategy should enable evidence-
based policy design in the future. 
Productivity in applied macroeconomic models 
How do existing applied macroeconomic models deal with productivity and the role of human 
capital, R&D, and product market competition? The CPB models MIMIC and WORLDSCAN 
distinguish workers of different skill levels, and MIMIC also specifies a training sector for 
employees. Exogenous R&D expenditures and the role of international R&D spillovers are 
considered in the WORLDSCAN model. The intensity of product market competition in terms 
of exogenous mark-up pricing can be studied in JADE, SAFE, MIMIC, and WORLDSCAN (in 
which differentiated varieties of consumer goods are specified). ATHENA has exogenous mark-
ups, but also allows for entry and exit of firms. Models used at other policy institutions tend to 
ignore these issues. Notable exceptions are the LINKAGE model of the World Bank (where 
workers can be skilled or unskilled, and where mark-up pricing can be studied in combination 
with entry/exit of firms), and the MULTIMOD model of the IMF (which has been extended 
with R&D and R&D spillovers). 
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Human Capital, R&D and Competition 
in Macroeconomic Analysis 
ENEPRI Working Paper No. 38/August 2005 
Erik Canton, Bert Minne, Ate Nieuwenhuis, Bert Smid 
and Marc van der Steeg 
1. Introduction 
The topic of economic growth is perhaps one of the most fundamental issues in 
macroeconomics. Economic growth directly affects the living standards of the population, and 
thereby the welfare level. The search for the fundamental determinants behind the growth 
process is an ongoing research theme. Production can be expanded through investments in 
factor inputs (such as physical capital) and through employment growth, but also by 
improvements in productivity. By working in a smarter way, more can be produced with given 
factor inputs. Also, new products and services can generate a higher value added for their users. 
Economists agree that the long-run growth potential in per capita income is determined by 
advances in productivity. A theory on economic growth is therefore a theory on productivity 
growth. There are, broadly speaking, two dominant growth theories: neoclassical growth models 
and endogenous growth models. Neoclassical growth models assume that productivity growth is 
exogenous, arising as ‘manna from heaven’. This view is challenged since the birth of new or 
endogenous growth theory in the early 1980s. According to new growth theory, long-run 
economic growth is affected by deliberate economic behaviour and human actions such as 
innovation and education. The debate whether long-run economic growth patterns can best be 
explained from traditional or endogenous growth theory is far from settled, but the notion that 
education and innovation can contribute to economic growth, at least during a certain time span, 
is now widely accepted among economists. 
Most macroeconomic models used at CPB assume exogenous productivity growth, in line with 
neoclassical growth theory.
1 Potential productivity benefits associated with investments in 
education and innovation are not taken into account. This feature has led to criticism. For 
example, in the run-up to elections, political parties submit their election platforms to CPB for 
an evaluation of the economic impact of the proposed policy changes. In the CPB-models, the 
assumption of exogenous productivity growth implies that additional expenditures on, say, 
education do not yield long-run productivity improvements and are therefore potentially 
‘undervalued’. In fact, the returns to education are implicitly set at zero. However, research on 
the benefits of education consistently produces substantial returns to education. Similar 
examples can be given for expenditures on R&D. However, while the benefits from schooling 
and R&D can be large, it typically takes a long time before these gains arrive, and also the costs 
associated with the investments need to be taken into account. 
In this paper we discuss various mechanisms to endogenise productivity, and to study the effects 
of policy. Particular attention is given to the role of education, R&D and market structure for 
the macroeconomic performance. The following steps need to be taken: 
 
                                                      
1 More precisely, changes in total factor productivity or labour-augmenting technological progress are 
exogenous in most CPB models (except WORLDSCAN). Macroeconomic labour productivity depends 
on the capital-labour ratio (and possibly some other factors). 2 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
•  We need to introduce a link between inputs such as knowledge, R&D and human capital 
and the output variable of interest (e.g. economic growth); 
•  We need to evaluate the impact of policy on the decisions to invest in education and R&D, 
and on the market structure. 
The proposed research strategy is as follows. In Chapter 2 we look at the literature on 
productivity. In particular, we review studies on the connection between (i) human capital and 
economic growth, (ii) R&D and economic growth, and (iii) market structure and economic 
growth. Chapter 3 deals with the effects of policy on education, R&D, and market structure. In 
Chapter 4 we recapitulate how productivity is incorporated in the CPB models, and in important 
macroeconomic models used throughout the world. Some final thoughts are presented in the 
Epilogue. 
2.  Review of theories on productivity 
What is the macroeconomic impact of changes in human capital, R&D, or the intensity of 
product market competition? Human capital can be introduced as an additional production 
factor, contributing to equilibrium production levels in a neoclassical growth model and to the 
balanced growth rate in an endogenous growth framework. Human capital can also play a 
productive role in terms of the absorption capacity to assimilate new technologies. Growth 
empirics indicate that an increase in average educational attainment of the labour force by one 
year increases long-run per capita output by about 6%. R&D can be introduced either as a 
separate production factor, or through its impact on total factor productivity. Empirical studies 
point out that R&D generates substantial returns, both in terms of innovation and through 
adoption of existing technologies. Finally, the impact of increased product market competition 
on macroeconomic performance can operate through two channels: improvements in static and 
dynamic efficiency. The potential gains from improved dynamic efficiency can be important, as 
innovation is increased. While increases in human capital, R&D, and product market 
competition can improve the macroeconomic performance, it can take a long time before these 
benefits arrive, as for instance it takes time to build human capital. 
2.1  Neoclassical growth theory 
It is helpful to first consider the standard neoclassical growth model as developed by Solow 
(1956). This theory assumes a production function of the type 
) , ( L K Af Y =  (2.1) 
where Y is output, A is Total Factor Productivity (TFP), K is physical capital, and L is labour. 
Labour productivity is defined by Y/L. Changes in TFP (A) are called Hicks neutral 
technological change.
2 
Another widely used neoclassical production function takes the form 
) , ( EL K f Y =  (2.2) 
E is an efficiency-index. For a given capital stock K and labour input L, changes in E lead to 
changes in labour productivity. Increases in E are thus referred to as labour-augmenting 
technological progress, also called Harrod neutral technological change. 
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Let x denote the rate of technological progress (either Hicks or Harrod neutral). Population 
growth increases the labour force at rate n. Long-run economic growth is equal to population 
growth and technological progress, n+x. As n and x are exogenously determined, it is referred to 
as exogenous growth. The short-run rate of economic growth can deviate from the balanced 
growth rate when the economy is adjusting towards a new equilibrium (transition dynamics). In 
the neoclassical view, each country has access to the world technology (A or E). New 
knowledge immediately spreads around the world without costs. An important prediction of this 
model is international convergence in output levels: poor countries grow faster than rich ones. 
Another prediction is that when capital is mobile, advanced economies should invest in poor 
countries where capital is scarce and the marginal returns to investment are high. 
2.2 Human  capital 
2.2.1  Human capital in a neoclassical framework 
According to human capital theory (developed by Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964)), education 
enhances a person’s skill level and thereby his or her human capital. A higher skill level in the 
workforce increases the production capacity. Although this sounds very straightforward, 
systematic research on how to incorporate human capital in theories of growth started only 
about two decades ago. 
As especially the neoclassical prediction of international convergence in per capita production 
levels is not supported by the data, Robert Lucas asked ‘Why doesn’t capital flow from rich to 
poor countries?’ (Lucas, 1990). His answer is that differences in returns to physical capital (as 
implied by the neoclassical growth model) become much smaller when account is taken of 
differences in human capital across countries: physical capital tends to move towards countries 
with more human capital. In the 1990s the standard neoclassical growth model has been revised 
by introducing human capital. For instance, Mankiw et al. (1992) propose a Cobb-Douglas 
production function of the form 
β α β α − − = 1 ) (EL H K Y  (2.3) 
where H is the human capital stock of the workforce, α is the production elasticity of physical 
capital, β is the production elasticity of human capital (α+β<1 to maintain exogenous balanced 
growth), and 1-α-β is the production elasticity of labour. Mankiw et al. use enrolment rates, but 
the human capital stock can also be determined from a macro-Mincer equation of the form 
) (s e H π =   (2.4) 
where  s is average years of schooling. As there is no heterogeneity, all individuals in this 
economy have a similar schooling level. Various forms for the function π can be chosen. Caselli 
(2004) uses a piecewise linear function with slope 0.13 for s≤4, 0.10 for 4<s≤8, and 0.07 for s>8 
(i.e. decreasing marginal returns to schooling). Bosworth and Collins (2003) assume a 7% 
return to each year of schooling. 
This extension has several implications. First, the average skill level in the workforce has an 
impact on the production level. An increase in the average years of schooling increases the 
human capital stock H, and thereby the production level Y. Second, when markets are 
competitive, factor returns are given by their marginal product, 
β α β α α − − − =
∂
∂
= 1 1 ) (EL H K
K
Y
r
 (2.5) 4 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
β α β α β α − − − − =
∂
∂
= ) ( ) 1 ( EL H K
EL
Y
wEL
 (2.6) 
where r is the return to physical capital, and wEL is the wage rate. So the human capital stock not 
only affects the wage rate, but also the interest rate (when the economy is closed; the case of an 
open economy is discussed in Section 2.2.4). Increases in the human capital stock thereby also 
lead to increases in the interest rate, and to adjustments in the physical capital stock. Third, 
changes in the stock of human capital only have a temporary impact on the growth rate; the 
balanced growth rate is again determined by the exogenous rate of labour-augmenting technical 
progress and population growth. 
2.2.2  Human capital and endogenous growth 
So far we have assumed that long-run economic growth is exogenous. An increase in human 
capital leads to higher production levels, but does not affect the balanced growth rate. Policies 
and deliberate actions to build human capital only have a transitory impact on economic growth, 
and the balanced growth rate is determined by parameters that cannot be manipulated. Lucas 
(1988) proposes to introduce endogenous growth through human capital accumulation. We will 
be brief in our summary; for an elaborate treatment of the analysis the reader is referred to 
Lucas (1988) and to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Suppose that the production function takes 
the form 
α α − = 1 ) (uH K Y  (2.7) 
where  H is human capital and u is time devoted to production. How is human capital 
accumulated? Schooling and experience gained at the work floor are two well-known ways to 
build human capital. The former is often labelled as learning-or-doing (as time devoted to 
schooling competes with production time), and the latter as learning-by-doing (Lucas, 1988). 
Suppose that each employee is allotted with one unit of time, which can be used for production 
or learning. Learning-or-doing can be modelled as 
δ γ − − = ) 1 ( u B H  (2.8) 
where  H γ  is the growth rate of human capital, 1-u is the time devoted to learning, B is the 
transformation rate of learning into human capital and δ is depreciation of human capital. The 
core of the model responsible for endogenous growth is that there are constant returns to scale 
with regard to reproducible factor inputs physical capital and human capital. The balanced 
growth rate in this economy is given by 
) )( / 1 ( * ρ δ θ γ − − = B  (2.9) 
where 1/θ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ is the rate of time preference. 
Consumer preferences and the human capital accumulation technology determine together the 
long-run growth rate. As economic growth is determined from structural parameters, growth is 
called endogenous.
3 Notice that human capital is a purely private commodity in this analysis. 
Increases in human capital translate into higher wages, and there are no external effects. So 
                                                      
3 There is also a class of models exhibiting ‘semi-endogenous’ growth, in which the balanced growth rate 
is determined by parameters that are typically viewed as invariant to policy manipulation, but where 
productivity growth is tied to the discovery of new designs through R&D by rational, profit-maximising 
agents (see Jones, 1995). HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 5 
 
there is no reason (in terms of economic efficiency) for government interference in this 
framework. The widespread argument that the government should support education because 
education is good for growth is therefore not valid in the Lucas-economy without spillovers. 
Lucas also considers a model with human capital externalities. Production is affected by the 
average human capital stock  H , i.e. 
ψ α α H uH K Y − = 1 ) (  (2.10) 
where ψ captures the size of the spillover effect. Individuals base their human capital investment 
decision on the private marginal product of human capital, taking the average human capital 
stock as given. The social marginal product of human capital takes the effect of individual 
human capital investments on the average human capital stock into account. In the presence of 
human capital spillovers there is a wedge between the private and the social marginal product of 
human capital. Without government action, there will be underinvestment in human capital 
from a social viewpoint. 
2.2.3  Time to build human capital 
Building human capital takes time. When using models with human capital for policy analysis 
and forecasts, one should take account of the time lag between the investment in human capital 
and the moment when the human capital can be used for productive purposes. Two aspects are 
important. First, the time lag depends on the schooling level. For instance, while an increase in 
tertiary education enrolment will lead to a higher inflow of skilled workers on the labour market 
after, say, four to six years, early childhood interventions will only materialise after ten to 
fifteen years. Second, due to cohort effects, an extension of the schooling period only gradually 
changes the average educational attainment of the labour force. The effects of an extension of 
the compulsory schooling age will have its full impact on the average schooling level in the 
workforce only after about 50 years. 
Let us return to a discrete time version of the Lucas (1988) model with learning-or-doing. The 
human capital accumulation function is 
] 1 )) ( 1 ( )[ 1 ( ) ( δ − + − − = t u B t H t H  (2.8’) 
In words, it is assumed that schooling in year t generates productive human capital in year t. It is 
also assumed that schooling refers to schooling of the whole labour force (agents are identical; 
there are no overlapping generations). An adjusted version of this human capital accumulation 
technology where account is taken of time lags could take the following form 
] 1 ) ) ( 1 ( )[ 1 ( ) (
0
δ τ λ
τ
τ − + − − = ∑
=
t
u B t H t H
 (2.8”) 
where τ≤t denotes the time when the schooling has taken place, and  τ λ  measures the impact of 
schooling in year τ on the human capital stock in year t. More complex specifications could take 
account of different transformation rates of learning into human capital formation and different 
depreciation rates at different schooling levels (e.g. primary, secondary, and tertiary). 6 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
2.2.4  Human capital in an open economy 
The Netherlands is a small and open economy. This openness may have several implications. 
First, international mobility of production factors will induce international arbitrage of factor 
returns. It is commonly believed that financial capital is much more mobile than human capital, 
so we would not expect massive migration to France if the French earn a somewhat higher 
college premium than the Dutch. And even financial capital is not perfectly mobile 
internationally. But let us assume that the interest rate applying for the Netherlands is 
determined on the world capital market. In an economy with a production technology such as 
(2.3), the stocks of physical capital are determined from 
β α
α ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ =
−
EL
H
EL
K
r
1
*
 (2.11) 
where  r
* is the world interest rate. Second, the notion of the Netherlands as a small open 
economy has implications for human capital policy. For instance, international differences in 
public contributions to higher education could lead to student migration (which is not 
necessarily undesirable). In that case, some coordination of higher education policies can be 
efficient. 
2.2.5  Human capital and technology adoption 
In the endogenous growth model by Lucas (1988), sustained economic growth is due to the 
accumulation of human capital over time. An alternative view is that a country’s human capital 
stock affects the rate of economic growth. For instance, in Romer’s (1990) analysis, innovations 
are generated by the human capital stock, and Nelson and Phelps (1966) assume that the human 
capital stock determines the ability to assimilate new technologies.
4 One way to model the idea 
that human capital builds absorptive capacity is to link the level of total factor productivity to 
the human capital stock, i.e. 
) (H A A =   (2.12) 
with A’>0. Whether it is the stock of human capital or its accumulation that is important for 
growth is a testable empirical question, to which we turn next. 
2.2.6 Empirical  relationship  between  human capital and economic growth 
Since the emergence of international datasets on major macroeconomic variables such as the 
Penn World Tables by Heston and Summers, a large empirical literature on the determinants of 
growth emerged. It is not our aim to review this literature, and the interested reader is referred to 
e.g. Krueger and Lindahl (2001) and Temple (1999). Instead, some influential papers are 
mentioned, and we will summarise the major findings. When studying the determinants of 
economic growth it is helpful to distinguish two approaches: a structural approach and a non-
structural approach. 
Non-structural approach 
The first approach is basically inspired by the idea of letting the data speak. Take a group of 
countries, collect data on whatever indicator that may affect economic growth, and run 
regressions to obtain quantitative relationships. Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin have 
                                                      
4 A recent empirical test of the Nelson-Phelps model is presented in Benhabib and Spiegel (2003). HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 7 
 
popularised this approach, including conventional economic variables such as investment 
shares, human capital, and initial income, but also not so conventional variables such as black 
market premium and political instability (cf. Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).
5 
What is the relationship between education and economic growth in this approach? Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) distinguish primary, secondary, and tertiary education, and study the 
relationship between educational attainment and economic growth for a large sample of 
countries. They do not find a significant effect from primary education of males and females on 
economic growth. For males a significant relationship is found for secondary and tertiary 
education. An increase in male secondary attainment by one standard deviation (0.68 year) 
corresponds to a 1.1%-point increase in economic growth. An increase in male tertiary 
education by one standard deviation (0.091 year) is estimated to raise economic growth by 
0.5%-point. They thus find a convex relationship between educational attainment and economic 
growth. A somewhat peculiar result is that female educational attainment is bad for economic 
growth. A possible explanation provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin is that less female 
attainment signifies more backwardness, and a higher growth potential through the convergence 
mechanism. Another (perhaps more convincing) explanation is that the regression results suffer 
from multi-collinearity when both male and female attainment are included (cf. Krueger and 
Lindahl, 2001). 
The apparent advantage of these so-called Barro-regressions is that the method can be useful to 
detect mechanisms that have been ignored by theorists. However, the inclusion of indicators is 
to some extent ad hoc. Also, the empirical results may depend on the included list of variables. 
Indeed, Levine and Renelt (1992) have shown that only few variables appear with robustly 
significant coefficients. They find a positive and robust correlation between average economic 
growth and the share of investment in GDP. Also the conditional convergence hypothesis (from 
Mankiw et al., 1992) is supported: a robust, negative correlation is found between initial per 
capita GDP and growth over the 1960-1989 period when the initial level of human capital 
investment is included. No robust correlation with growth is found for a broad array of other 
indicators.
6 
Structural approach 
The second approach is to derive the econometric model directly from a theoretical model. 
According to Aghion and Howitt (1998), it is useful to distinguish between level effects and 
growth effects of the human capital stock. 
Level effects 
Let us first discuss economic models where the human capital stock affects the production level, 
or – in first-differences – changes in the human capital stock affect production growth. 
As mentioned before, Mankiw et al. (1992) extend the standard neoclassical growth model with 
human capital. Investments in human capital are measured by using a schooling variable, 
namely the percentage of the labour force enrolled in secondary education (primary and tertiary 
education are not considered).
7 The econometric results show that the inclusion of human 
                                                      
5 Earlier, this approach was followed in Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989). 
6 A response to the critical analysis in Levine and Renelt (1992) can be found in the paper ‘I just ran two 
million regressions’ by Sala-i-Martin (1997). 
7 Mankiw et al. (1992) use UNESCO data on the fraction of the eligible population (aged 12 to 17) 
enrolled in secondary school. They then multiply this enrolment rate by the fraction of the working-age 
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capital improves the fit of the model. A representative outcome of their analysis is the following 
production function 
3 / 1 3 / 1 3 / 1 L H K Y =  (2.13) 
This implies a production elasticity of human capital of 1/3: 1% more human capital translates 
into 1/3% higher production. It is important to note that in equilibrium, the human capital stock 
affects a country’s production level, but not the rate of economic growth. Changes in the stock 
of human capital will lead to transition dynamics, and this predicts a positive relationship 
between human capital accumulation and economic growth during the transition period. While 
Mankiw et al. do find evidence for such a positive relationship for the total country sample, 
their results are not robust to changes in the country sample. No significant relationship between 
human capital investments and GDP growth (per working-age person) is found for the OECD 
countries. 
Data on educational enrolment may suffer from measurement problems, and noisy data can lead 
to a downward bias in the regression results. De la Fuente and Doménech (2000) construct new 
data on attainment levels by removing some peculiarities (probably due to definition changes) in 
the Barro and Lee (1996) data. The new dataset by De la Fuente and Doménech includes 21 
OECD countries over the period 1960-1990. De la Fuente and Doménech (2000, 2001) use this 
new data to empirically investigate the relationship between production and human capital, both 
in levels and in first differences. They find a production elasticity of human capital of 0.271 
(statistically significant), which is close to the earlier findings by Mankiw et al. (1992). Also 
Temple (1999) finds an insignificant connection between changes in human capital and 
economic growth at first instance, but he finds a significantly positive relationship when outliers 
are eliminated from the data: “in the 64 countries that remain in the sample, there is a 
reasonably strong correlation between increases in human capital and output growth, just as one 
would expect” (p. 133). Finally, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) investigate the relationship 
between human capital accumulation and economic growth for a panel of 21 OECD countries 
between 1971 and 1998. They find that one extra year of schooling increases the long-run per 
capita output level by about 6%. This is an average effect however. If education is subject to 
decreasing returns, the impact on per capita output might be smaller in countries with higher 
levels of educational attainment (such as the Netherlands). 
Growth effects 
A second approach is to investigate the interaction between the human capital stock and 
technological change. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) introduce a model where human capital 
affects TFP through two channels. First, following Romer (1990), human capital can directly 
influence TFP by increasing the capacity to innovate. Second, following Nelson and Phelps 
(1966), human capital affects the speed of technological catch-up and diffusion of knowledge. 
The empirical results by Benhabib and Spiegel suggest that the human capital level has a 
positive effect on GDP growth. A 1% larger stock of human capital corresponds to an increase 
in the growth rate by about 0.13%. The authors furthermore find that countries with a larger 
human capital stock show faster technological catch-up. When the country sample is divided 
into three sub-samples, it is found that the innovation-effect dominates for the richest 26 
countries, while for the poorest third of the countries only the adoption-effect plays a role. Both 
effects are insignificant for the intermediate-income countries. Another study investigating 
interactions between education and technological change is Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
They also find that catch-up growth is faster when the initial human capital stock is larger. HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 9 
 
Quality of human capital 
International comparison of schooling data is difficult. One year of schooling in Tanzania is not 
the same as one year of schooling in the Netherlands. Barro (1991) tries to take account of 
differences in educational quality, by including student-teacher ratios and adult literacy rates. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) use expenditures on education as a fraction of GDP as a proxy 
for educational quality. They find a positive relationship between public spending on education 
and economic growth. The estimation suggests that a one standard deviation increase in public 
spending on education as a fraction of GDP (i.e. about 1.5%-point) raises the annual growth rate 
by 0.3%-point. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) use as a proxy for the quality of the labour force 
the average performance on an international mathematics and sciences test. They find a strong 
relationship between the quality of the labour force and the rate of economic growth: a one 
standard deviation increase in the test score corresponds to a 1.46%-point higher growth rate.
8 
Table 2.1 summarises the findings on the empirical connection between education and 
economic growth. Earlier studies typically find a positive relationship between educational 
attainment (as a proxy for the human capital stock) and subsequent economic growth, and an 
insignificant effect from educational investments on the growth rate. These results suffer from 
measurement errors in human capital data (which are worsened when first differences are taken) 
and specification problems (cf. Krueger and Lindahl, 2001).  
Table 2.1 Summary of growth empirics 
Study Human  capital 
data 
Dependent 
variable 
Human 
capital stock 
Change in 
human capital 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995) 
Barro and Lee 
(1993) 
Growth in per 
capita income 
+ for males 
− for females 
0 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) 
UNESCO Growth  in 
income per 
worker 
 0 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994)  Kyriacou (1991)  Growth in per 
capita income 
 0 
    Growth in TFP  +   
Temple (1999)  Kyriacou (1991), 
elimination of 
unrepresentative 
observations 
Growth in per 
capita income 
 + 
De la Fuente and Doménech 
(2000, 2001) 
Revised version of 
Barro and Lee 
(1996) 
Per capita 
income level 
+  
   Growth  in  per 
capita income 
 + 
Bassanini and Scarpetta 
(2001) 
Revised version of 
Barro and Lee 
(1996) 
Growth in per 
capita income 
 + 
Krueger and Lindahl (2001)  World Values 
Survey 
Growth in per 
capita income 
 + 
                                                      
8 Wößmann (2003) presents a review on human capital indicators, paying particular attention to 
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More recent studies that aim to deal with these two issues tend to find a positive relationship 
between changes in human capital and economic growth, and no relationship between 
educational attainment and subsequent growth. 
Finally, it should be noted that in the growth empirics discussed above it is assumed that 
causality runs from human capital to economic growth. However, according to human capital 
theory people invest in education in order to increase their expected future income. This would 
imply a reverse causal relationship between human capital and income in macro-regressions: 
economic growth induces people to invest in human capital. Bils and Klenow (2000) indeed 
find evidence that an increase in the returns to schooling leads to a higher enrolment rate. 
2.3  Research and development 
2.3.1 Conceptual  issues 
Productivity can increase through better skills, but also through an improved technology. Earlier 
empirical evidence made some authors conclude that technology improvements are of minor 
importance. However, the way this was measured (growth accounting) may have been 
misleading, attributing a smaller fraction of growth to innovation than its true contribution 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Chapter 12). At present, it is widely acknowledged that technology 
improvements are an important force behind long-run economic growth. 
Technological know-how, or rather knowledge in general, comes in many forms (see also David 
Romer (Section 3.4, 2001). It is useful to think of a continuum of types of knowledge, ranging 
from highly abstract to highly applied. At one end of the spectrum is broadly applicable, basic 
scientific knowledge, such as the Pythagorean theorem and the theory of quantum mechanics. 
At the other end is knowledge about specific goods, such as how to open your safe. In between 
there is great diversity. Hence, the accumulation of knowledge is a complex phenomenon, and 
there is no unified explanatory theory. 
Still, as emphasised by Paul Romer (1990), many types of knowledge are non-rival, i.e. the use 
of an item of knowledge in one application does not hinder its use in another application. 
Consequently, the production and allocation of knowledge cannot be completely governed by 
competitive market forces. Once an item of knowledge has been discovered, the marginal cost 
of supplying it to an additional user is zero. The rental price of knowledge would thus be zero in 
a competitive market, and the creation of knowledge cannot be motivated by the prospect of 
private economic gain. 
Romer (1990) further mentions that knowledge is heterogeneous along a second dimension: 
excludability. A good is excludable if it is possible to prevent others from using it. Conventional 
private goods like clothing are excludable. In the case of knowledge, excludability depends both 
on the nature of the knowledge itself and on economic institutions governing property rights. 
Patent laws give inventors rights over the use of their inventions, copyright laws disallow the 
copying of books. Meanwhile, some knowledge is sufficiently complex that it can be kept secret 
without copyright or patent protection, and other knowledge is so easy to retrieve that no 
effective legal protection is possible. 
2.3.2  R&D in a neoclassical framework 
Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996) develop a neoclassical growth model with human capital, 
physical capital, and technological know-how. Investments in technological know-how are 
measured by gross domestic expenditures on R&D as a fraction of GDP. Nonneman and HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 11 
 
Vanhoudt assume that the market for technological know-how works perfectly (there are no 
external effects or economies of scale). They estimate a production function of the type 
χ β α χ β α − − − = 1 L T H AK Y  (2.14) 
where  T stands for technological know-how, and α,  β, and χ are production elasticities of 
physical capital, human capital, and technological know-how. A representative result is 
5 / 2 35 / 3 20 / 3 3 / 1 L T H AK Y =  (2.15) 
This means that a 1% increase in the stock of technological know-how would yield an increase 
in output of about 0.09%.  
Some comments are in order. First, the assumption of Nonneman and Vanhoudt that knowledge 
is a ‘normal’ economic commodity, tradable on markets, does not correspond to insights from 
modern growth theory, and can lead to misspecification of their econometric model. Nonneman 
and Vanhoudt express their model in per capita units, dividing all terms by L. If the market for 
technological know-how fails and knowledge has aspects of a public good, then it is the total 
stock of technological know-how that matters for per capita income. Second, changes in the 
stock of technological know-how, like changes in the stock of physical and human capital, have 
only a temporary impact on the growth rate; the balanced growth rate is again determined by the 
exogenous rate of labour-augmenting technical progress and population growth.  
2.3.3  R&D and endogenous growth 
A number of authors have suggested that new ideas are the engine of growth. It is not our 
purpose here to systematically review the literature (a concise review is available in Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare, 2004). Instead we will briefly mention some milestones in the development of 
endogenous growth models with R&D. 
A pioneer in the area of endogenous growth is Paul Romer. Romer (1990) emphasises the 
public-good character of knowledge: ideas, designs, and blueprints are in principal non-rival. 
However, they may be made excludable through protection by patent law and copyright law. 
Firms engaged in R&D are then able to protect their inventions during a certain time period and 
may reap the benefits from their investments. The prospect of (temporary) monopoly profits 
encourages firms to invest in R&D. 
Suppose that the production function takes the form 
∑
=
− =
N
j
j L K A Y
1
1 α α
 (2.16) 
where  j K  is input of the jth type of the specialised intermediate good, and N is the number of 
varieties of the capital goods (cf. Romer (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)). Technological 
progress yields an expansion in N. In equilibrium, the production function can be rewritten to 
α α − = 1 L ANK Y  (2.17) 
Thus, technological change in the form of a steady increase in N is not subject to diminishing 
returns, and this property of the production function is essential to generate endogenous growth. 
The next step in the analysis is to study the expansion in the variety of products. New growth 
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development. For instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin assume that the cost to create a new type of 
product is fixed at η units of Y. However, most models assume some randomness in the 
discovery of new products (generating fluctuations at the aggregate level). 
Two other economists who made important contributions on the link between R&D and 
economic growth are Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop an 
endogenous growth model with creative destruction (based on the ideas of Schumpeter). R&D 
efforts can lead to innovations, i.e. improvements in the general purpose technology. Protection 
by patent law gives a firm the monopoly right to market a new product. The prospect of 
monopoly profits encourages firms to develop new and better products, so that the innovating 
firm can enter the market and the incumbent monopolist is replaced (Schumpeterian creative 
destruction). Economic growth is determined by the speed of the innovation process. The 
market solution may not correspond to the socially optimal solution. In the model by Aghion 
and Howitt, economic growth can be too high or too low. On the one hand, intertemporal 
knowledge spillovers can reduce R&D investments below the optimal level. By assumption, 
entrepreneurs only look at the returns to R&D during the life span of their company. The firm is 
replaced when another entrepreneur develops a better product, but this innovation builds forth 
on knowledge embodied in the previous product generation. Innovators thus stand on the 
shoulders of giants. The positive externality of intertemporal knowledge spillover leads to 
private returns falling short of social returns to R&D, depressing R&D activity below its 
socially optimal level. On the other hand, by assumption entrepreneurs do not consider the 
consequences of innovation for the profits of incumbent firms. Innovation yields improved 
products, and the existing product is driven out of the market (business stealing). The lost 
profits are not reflected in the private return, but they do reduce the social return to R&D. The 
negative externality of creative destruction thereby leads to private returns exceeding the social 
return, possibly triggering excessive R&D activity. 
One way to model the idea that R&D matters for growth is to introduce a relationship between 
TFP and the R&D stock (cf. Griffith et al., 2000, 2004), i.e. 
) (T A A =   (2.18) 
where A’>0. The production function then looks like 
α α − = 1 ) ( L K T A Y  (2.19) 
This equation says that countries with a larger R&D stock have a higher level of total factor 
productivity; or, taking first differences, countries with higher R&D investments experience 
faster TFP growth. 
The relationship between R&D and TFP as expressed in equation (2.18) can reflect two effects: 
innovation and adoption. R&D is an essential factor in the innovation process, and R&D helps 
firms to build absorption capacity, i.e. the ability to exploit knowledge spillovers (cf. Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989). This concept of absorption capacity captures the idea that one has to do basic 
research oneself in order to understand results of other researchers. 
2.3.4  Time to research and develop 
Similar to the accumulation of human capital (Section 2.2.3), it should be noted that research 
and development of new products is a time consuming process. Especially for basic research it 
can be a long way before new insights can be applied in new products, processes, or services. 
But also for more applied research it holds that it can take a long time to further develop a HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 13 
 
prototype product, and to bring the product to the market. We can take account of such time lags 
by specifying the law of motion (in discrete time) of the stock of technological knowledge as 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( & ) (
0
− − + =∑
=
t T D R t T
t
δ τ λ
τ
τ
 (2.20) 
where  τ λ  has a similar interpretation as before. Again, this accumulation function can be 
refined. For example we may want to distinguish between applied and basic research (or, 
perhaps more pragmatic, between public and private research). It can be expected that applied 
research contributes faster to the stock of technological know-how than basic research. 
2.3.5  Empirical relationship between R&D and economic growth 
Returns to R&D 
There is by now a substantial literature on the impact of R&D on output. Cameron (1998) 
presents an overview of the empirical literature on the returns to R&D. The impact is often 
estimated to be quite high. A typical estimate of the social rate of return to R&D would be in the 
order of 20 to 30 percent when estimated at the industry level, and can be much higher 
economy-wide (Jones and Williams (1998) even mention an economy-wide social rate of return 
of around 100%). Estimated private returns to R&D are in the order of 7-14%.
9 Discrepancies 
between marginal private and marginal social returns to R&D imply that the incentives for firms 
to invest in R&D are sub-optimal. Jones and Williams (1998) conclude that there is substantial 
underinvestment in R&D: “optimal R&D spending as a share of GDP is more than two to four 
times larger than actual spending” (p. 1121).
10 
However, empirical estimates of the returns to R&D are not undisputed. First, the estimates are 
subject to measurement errors. For example, econometric specifications do not allow making a 
distinction between intended and unintended spillovers, while only unintended spillovers are a 
market failure. In other words, knowledge flows which carry a market price and knowledge 
flows which are not priced cannot be distinguished in the statistics (cf. Cornet and Van de Ven, 
2004). 
Second, estimates on the returns to R&D might be unreliable due to specification problems. For 
instance, Comin (2004) warns that there are many factors omitted in the typical regression that 
simultaneously affect TFP growth and the innovators’ incentives to invest in R&D, and 
mentions as the most obvious candidates anything that enhances disembodied productivity, like 
managerial and organisational practices. When these factors are ignored, the estimated returns to 
R&D are biased upwards. Comin pioneers an alternative approach in an attempt to overcome 
the difficulties that beset the econometric framework. He starts from the free-entry condition for 
innovators and the fact that most R&D innovations are embodied. Upon calibrating his model to 
US data he finds that the annual contribution of R&D to productivity growth is smaller than 
three to five tenths of one percentage point. His analysis implies that, if the innovation 
                                                      
9 Some studies report much higher estimates of the private returns to R&D (up to 30%, see e.g. the 
discussion in Griffith, 2000). This also raises the question why arbitrage, i.e. exploiting profitable 
investment opportunities so that rates of return are driven down to normal levels, does not take place. 
Perhaps a somewhat higher rate of return to R&D can be explained from the risk premium demanded for 
the often substantial uncertainties of R&D endeavours. On the other hand, when risks of research projects 
are uncorrelated, the market might be able to reduce the aggregate risk through risk pooling. Rates of 
return to R&D in the order of 30% are therefore not very plausible. 
10 For the Netherlands, Van Leeuwen and Van der Wiel (2003) find that ICT spillovers are important. 14 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
technology takes the form assumed in the literature, the actual US R&D intensity may be close 
to the socially optimal one. Overall we can conclude that while most studies suggest substantial 
private and social returns to R&D, these results are not undisputed.  
R&D and economic growth 
Overviews of the literature on R&D and economic growth can be found in Cameron (1998) and 
Jones and Williams (1998). Here we confine ourselves to a study of Griffith et al. (2000, 2004) 
in which particular attention is paid to the ‘two faces’ of R&D (cf. Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). 
Griffith et al. investigate TFP convergence in a panel of industries across 13 OECD countries 
over the 1970-1990 period. For each industry, the distance to the technological frontier is used 
as an indicator for potential technology transfer, where the technological frontier is defined by 
the country with the highest TFP in the corresponding industry. Adoption of technology is then 
reflected in international convergence of TFP-levels, also called catch-up growth. The direct 
effect of R&D shifts the technological frontier. The researchers find that both R&D and human 
capital are important for movements towards and shifts of the technological frontier. The 
authors present estimates of the total social return to R&D, and the return due to adoption / 
imitation. Being the technological leader in most industries, the returns to R&D in the USA are 
almost fully determined by the direct innovation-effect. The return to R&D from technology 
adoption is only 0.5%. Also for the Netherlands it is found that the innovation-effect is more 
important than the adoption-effect.
11 Technology adoption is a major determinant of the social 
return to R&D for the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Japan, and the UK. 
2.4  Product market competition 
2.4.1  Competition in a framework with exogenous growth 
Competition and market structure 
The neoclassical model assumes perfect competition: the economy comprises of many identical 
firms, which are price takers on a perfectly competitive product market. Output prices equal 
marginal production costs in this model. In this section we want to consider the macroeconomic 
impact of competition, and therefore we need to relax the neoclassical assumption of perfect 
competition, and introduce market power. The most well-known form of market dominance is 
when there is only one firm in the market, i.e. a monopoly. Such a monopoly will maximise its 
producer surplus, and charge prices above marginal costs. Interestingly, under certain 
assumptions, entrance of one other firm can completely destroy monopoly power, and in 
equilibrium the two firms charge the competitive price (i.e. prices equal to marginal costs). This 
is known as the Bertrand paradox (cf. Tirole, 1988). Two firms can also strategically interact in 
Cournot competition, where they choose their produced quantities simultaneously. The 
Industrial Organisation (IO) literature deals with such strategic interactions between competing 
firms in more detail, and we refer the interested reader to Tirole (1988) for an extensive 
treatment. 
Another way to study the role of competition and its macroeconomic impact is to consider an 
economy where firms compete monopolistically, while the number of firms is assumed to be 
large so that one can ignore strategic interactions. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) provide an analytical 
framework. In the Dixit-Stiglitz framework product prices exceed marginal costs, and the mark-
up depends on the intensity of competition. The assumption of monopolistic competition 
                                                      
11 In contrast, Keller (2004) finds that only about 4.7% of Dutch productivity growth can be attributed to 
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implies the presence of entry barriers such as fixed production costs. An interesting aspect of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz framework is that intensified competition can take various forms, such as 
closer substitutability of the goods, lower fixed costs of production, or more firms (see also 
Smulders and Van de Klundert, 1995). 
Competition and technology adoption 
While it is often argued that the benefits from improved static efficiency in terms of consumer 
prices are modest,
12 gains associated with the adoption of new technology can be much larger. 
The neoclassical model assumes that technology is a public good, arising as manna from 
heaven. New technologies immediately spread around the world, and firms can access and 
implement the new technology without incurring any costs. Total factor productivity is therefore 
identical for all firms and for all countries.
13 This is unrealistic as, for given factor inputs, some 
firms are able to produce more than others. Also at the macroeconomic level there is convincing 
evidence for large international differences in TFP-levels, e.g. Hall and Jones (1999). Therefore, 
in the words of Edward Prescott, we need a theory of TFP (Prescott, 1998). Many explanations 
for TFP differences have been proposed in the literature, such as differences in the legal 
framework, social capital, climate, political structure, openness, and intensity of competition, on 
which we want to focus here. 
Several studies have investigated the connection between competition and the adoption of new 
technologies (see Canton et al. (2002) for an overview). For example, the connection between 
competition and TFP can be studied in a principal-agent framework. Nickell (1996) notes that 
more intense competition in the product market may increase the opportunities for shareholders 
to effectively monitor the performance of managers (i.e. reduce principal-agent problems) by 
providing yardsticks or sharpen incentives (as profits become more sensitive to managerial 
effort in a more competitive environment). An opposite effect of competition is also possible (at 
least in theory): Martin (1993) develops a Cournot model where X-inefficiency increases with 
the number of firms. The idea is that marginal revenues decline when there are more active 
firms, so the principal has fewer incentives to monitor agents and managerial slack increases. 
However, in an empirical analysis of the implementation of the Single Market Program in 
Europe, Griffith (2001) finds that the resulting increase in product market competition led to an 
improvement in overall levels of efficiency. Interestingly, stronger efficiency gains occurred in 
firms where management and ownership were separated (say, ‘principal-agent type of firms’). 
By-and-large, to study the macroeconomic connection between competition and technology 
adoption we could assume that TFP is a function of the intensity of competition, i.e. 
) (COMP A A =  (2.21) 
where  COMP is an indicator for the intensity of product market competition. A change in 
competition will affect the economy’s total factor productivity and aggregate production 
possibilities. 
Competition and R&D 
The intensity of competition can also influence firms’ decisions to invest in R&D. This, in turn, 
affects dynamic efficiency. To study the macroeconomic effects of such a connection between 
                                                      
12 For instance, Matheron and Maury (2004) estimate the welfare cost of monopolistic competition 
between 0.4 and 1.2% of consumption. 
13 Or, in models with labour-augmenting technological change it is assumed that the efficiency index for 
labour is identical for all firms and for all countries. 16 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
competition and R&D, we could consider an extended version of the model in Nonneman and 
Vanhoudt (1996). Nonneman and Vanhoudt consider R&D expenditures as exogenous. We 
conjecture that research activity is a function of the competition intensity, i.e. 
) ( & & COMP D R D R =  (2.22) 
In fact, what we do here is an attempt to endogenise R&D activity, and instead of providing a 
structural model we take the short-cut of a reduced form relationship. In the model by 
Nonneman and Vanhoudt, R&D adds to the production capacity in a similar way as the other 
production factors (i.e. it is a rival and excludable input in the production process; see also our 
earlier discussion), and therefore firms find it profitable to invest in it. We do not have strong 
opinions about the functional form of this relationship between competition intensity and R&D. 
Competition can discourage R&D, when firms find it harder to reap the returns from their R&D 
benefits when price competition is fierce. Competition can also be conducive for R&D, for 
instance when firms compete dynamically in a more Schumpeterian sense. And perhaps the 
relationship between competition and R&D is nonlinear, positive at some level of competition 
and negative at other levels. Empirical research on the relationship between competition and 
innovation is scarce, and does not provide uniform results. The properties of the (augmented) 
neoclassical production function (Equation 2.14) imply that a change in competition intensity 
will change the stock of technological know-how and the long-run production potential in the 
economy. This will lead to transitory changes in economic growth, until the new equilibrium is 
restored. For an elaborate discussion on the relationship between competition and innovation, 
the reader is referred to Baumol (2002). 
2.4.2 Competition  and endogenous growth 
In Equation 2.22 we postulated a relationship between competition and R&D, or dynamic 
efficiency of the firm. Theory provides two explanations for such a relationship, which we will 
discuss here.
14 
The first mechanism describes competition between innovating entrants and incumbent firms 
(Aghion and Howitt, 1992; see also Section 2.3.3). An innovating entrant can capture the entire 
market, and drive the incumbent monopolist out of business. R&D investments by potential 
entrants are thus driven by the prospect of (temporary) monopoly profits. Instead, incumbent 
firms only enjoy an incremental increase in profits when they innovate. Under certain 
conditions it therefore holds that only entrants innovate (the so-called Arrow’s replacement 
effect). Entrants destroy incumbents when they leapfrog them through fundamental innovation. 
In the course of time, the economy consists of a sequence of temporary monopolists, with ever 
increasing efficiency. Competition is characterised by creation and destruction. The competitive 
process is described by two determinants, i.e. the return on investment in R&D (as reflected in 
the firm’s mark-up) and the expected lifetime. If there is no mark-up, there is no innovation and 
macroeconomic productivity stagnates. Firms live eternally. In contrast, if the entrants can earn 
a monopoly profit on their R&D-investments, the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction 
will yield innovation and economic growth.
15 
                                                      
14 Kamien and Schwartz (1975) and Cayseele (1998) present surveys on the empirical relationship 
between competition and innovation. 
15 A slightly different approach analyses the impact of monopolistic competition, where entrants do not 
destroy incumbents, but they gain market share at the cost of the market shares of incumbents (Grossman 
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The second mechanism describes competition between incumbent firms (Aghion et al., 2001; 
Aghion and Howitt, 2005). Implicitly, there are large barriers to market entry, so there are no 
entrants. Incumbents innovate based on their expected incremental profits. These are the profits 
on innovation less the profits they would have earned without innovation. The incumbents differ 
in efficiency. If the most efficient firms innovate, they cannot be imitated by their rivals. 
Therefore, they can always earn a monopoly mark-up. The firms with lower efficiency than the 
most efficient firms can catch up. Competition is measured by imitation costs. Higher imitation 
costs imply less competition, because lagging firms are discouraged to catch up and become 
fiercer competitors. For all firms it holds that profits (without innovation) increase if 
competition intensity decreases. Then, more competition intensity stimulates the most efficient 
firms to innovate, while the lagging firms are discouraged. In the course of time, firms mutually 
change positions in a process of jumping forward and catching up. In equilibrium, the 
distribution of efficiencies of the firms needs to be stable. Particular combinations of parameters 
may lead to an inverted U-shape between competition and innovation. That is, innovation 
activity is maximised somewhere between perfect competition and monopoly. 
2.5 Interactions  between  human  capital, R&D, and competition 
An advantage of formalising human capital, R&D, and competition in a macroeconomic 
framework is that interactions can be studied (see for instance Redding (1996) and Bucci 
(2003)). Such interactions can also have consequences for the effectiveness of economic policy. 
In particular, three types of interactions are distinguished: 
•  Human capital and R&D; 
•  Human capital and competition; 
•  R&D and competition. 
The interactions between R&D and competition have already been discussed in Section 2.4, and 
here we will confine ourselves to a discussion of the other two types of interactions. 
First, the stock of human capital can interact with an economy’s R&D activity. The major input 
into the R&D process is highly skilled labour. As we will see in the next chapter, government 
policies to stimulate R&D typically take the form of demand side subsidies, i.e. subsidies for 
firms in order to reduce the costs of R&D. Romer (2000) has argued that such R&D subsidies 
will not work when the supply of scientists is inelastic. In case of fixed supply of researchers, 
R&D subsidies will result in higher wages of R&D employees, and not in increased R&D 
activity. It would then be more effective to encourage the supply of scientists, by making it 
more attractive for students to choose research-oriented graduate programs, for instance by 
offering generous fellowships to students in natural sciences or engineering. Another potentially 
interesting interaction between human capital and R&D is related to educational production. 
Loosely put, it takes high skilled labour to produce high skilled people. Extension of the higher 
education sector means less high skilled workers in other sectors in the economy. 
Second, the human capital stock may interact with the competition intensity. One example of 
such an interrelationship is also discussed in Section 2.4, i.e. when skilled labour forms the 
major input in the R&D process, and competition refers to dynamic competition in the sense of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction. Abundance of skilled labour can drive down the wages of 
researchers, making R&D less costly. This in turn could encourage R&D activity, speed up the 
innovation process, and intensify dynamic competition in the industry. Another example is 
earlier discussed in the context of technology adoption (cf. Canton et al., 2002): learning to 
operate new technologies (which may be a more specific form of human capital) is more 
attractive when employees work for more competitive firms. 18 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
3.  Effects of government policy 
How can policy affect the formation of human capital and R&D activity, and what is known 
about the relationship between competition policy and macroeconomic outcomes? We 
distinguish between human capital policies aimed at enrolment (a quantity indicator) and 
educational quality. Especially early childhood interventions have been found effective, both in 
terms of raising average years of education and improving student performance. R&D policies 
include subsidy programs to encourage private R&D, but also instruments to make better use of 
the existing knowledge base. Estimates on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies show substantial 
variation, and outcomes will depend on (country-) specific institutional arrangements. Finally, 
the literature on the macroeconomic impact of competition policy generally finds positive 
effects in terms of GDP or total factor productivity. Unfortunately, convincing policy evaluation 
studies are scarce, and little is known about the causal impact of these instruments. Application 
of new methods in the field of experimental economics should enable evidence-based policy 
design in the future. 
3.1 Human  capital
16 
How does policy affect education, and hence the accumulation of human capital? There are two 
channels through which policy can operate: through enrolment, that is, a measure of educational 
quantity, or through the impact on educational quality. 
The outline of this section is as follows. First, in Section 3.1.1 we briefly review the various 
reasons for public intervention in the education sector, with particular reference to education 
spillovers. Subsequently, in Section 3.1.2 we try to sketch how the important policy 
interventions affect educational quantity (i.e. enrolment and/or educational attainment) and 
quality, distinguishing among interventions at different levels of education. Section 3.1.3 
concludes. 
3.1.1  Rationale for public intervention in education
17 
Governments all over the world intervene substantially in education. Various reasons for public 
intervention in education have been identified in the literature. One can think of paternalistic 
motives, and equity (i.e. income-distributional) considerations. The most important motivation 
for public intervention in education, however, is the occurrence of market failures (efficiency 
motives). Examples of market failures in education are externalities, capital market constraints, 
insurance market imperfections, and imperfect information and transparency problems (cf. CPB 
and CHEPS, 2001).
18 Here, we will briefly focus on education spillovers. The idea of education 
                                                      
16 We focus solely on education here, and do not consider policy in the context of the other components 
of human capital formation, encompassing (work-related) training, experience and learning-by-doing. 
One reason for this omission is that the scope for public intervention regarding these other types of human 
capital formation is generally assumed to be relatively limited, particularly when compared to education. 
Furthermore, due to certain econometric problems, reliable estimates of the impact of policy on training 
participation, and subsequently of the effect of training on productivity, earnings and economic growth 
are rather scarce, as argued by Donselaar et al. (2003). However, we should bear in mind that post-school 
learning is an important source of human capital formation, accounting for as much as one third to one 
half of all skill formation in a modern economy (cf. Heckman, 2000).  
17 The reader is referred to Van der Steeg (2005) for a more comprehensive analysis of the various 
rationales for government intervention in education, and of externalities in particular.   
18 Different types of market failures may require different types of public interventions as well. For 
example, capital market imperfections can be solved by means of public provisioning of loans to students, 
whereas the occurrence of education externalities may call for government subsidisation of education. HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 19 
 
externalities is that the benefits of individually acquired education may not be restricted to the 
individual, but might spill over to others as well, accruing at higher levels of aggregation (e.g. 
the public). Spillovers, if not already internalised by public intervention, may drive a wedge 
between the social and private rate of return to education.  
The relevant question is whether there is any empirical evidence for the prevalence of positive 
externalities of education at current levels of policy efforts, and if so, how large these spillovers 
are. Based on reviews of the recent literature on human capital spillovers by Venniker (2000), 
Temple (2001) and CPB and CHEPS (2001), we can draw the following conclusions. First, 
empirical evidence is rather scarce. Second, economic literature is ambiguous about the 
existence of human capital externalities at current levels of public intervention, delivering some 
indications for positive externalities, but not very strong and undisputed. Examples of studies 
finding that private and social returns to education are roughly the same at current levels of 
government intervention are Gemmel (1997), Blundell et al. (1999), Ciccone and Peri (2000), 
and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001).
19  
Third, looking more specifically at different types of education spillovers, we observe that the 
lack of (consistent) evidence is particularly eminent for spillovers from an individual’s 
education to higher wages and productivity of others (i.e. static externalities), and in the form of 
technological progress and diffusion of new technologies (i.e. dynamic externalities).  
Fourth, with respect to so-called non-pecuniary  (or social) external benefits of education, 
evidence is somewhat more consistent and promising, particularly concerning the effects of 
education on crime reduction (e.g. Lochner and Moretti, 2004) and health outcomes.
20 It should 
be stressed that these non-pecuniary spillovers are abstracted from in standard (macro-Mincer) 
estimations of social returns to education, as these returns are generally measured in terms of 
effects on GDP or productivity. This implies that social returns to education may exceed private 
returns if we take into account these non-pecuniary spillovers. However, we are unaware of any 
attempts to incorporate these non-pecuniary spillovers in an econometric analysis.  
We may conclude that on the basis of the available empirical literature on education spillovers it 
is difficult to make precise statements about the optimal scale at which governments should 
intervene in education, at least on efficiency grounds. Moreover, the scale at which certain 
spillovers can be reaped may differ across education levels and types, as well as across socio-
economic groups (cf. Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). This has repercussions for the optimal 
allocation of government budgets.  
Apart from efficiency motives to intervene in education, equity or income-distributional 
considerations may act as an important additional motivation. Tinbergen (1975) argued that 
there is a role for governments in reducing wage inequality by means of education subsidies. 
The central idea is that raising the average number of years of education (or, more particularly, 
increasing enrolment at higher levels of education), will make low-skilled workers scarcer, 
raising their wages, whereas the higher supply of highly educated workers reduces their wages. 
In other words, the higher relative supply of skilled workers resulting from education policy 
reduces wage inequality by lowering the private monetary return to education. There is some 
empirical work that seems to support this mechanism (e.g. Dur and Teulings, 2001; Teulings 
and Van Rens, 2003), showing that a rise in average educational attainment lowers the private 
                                                      
19 Moretti (2004a; 2004b) are notable exceptions to this literature, finding evidence for significant 
positive spillovers of (higher) education at the city level on wages and productivity. For instance, Moretti 
(2004a) finds that a one percentage point increase in the supply of college graduates raises high school 
drop-outs’ wages by 1.9%, high school graduates wages by 1.6%, and college graduates wages by 0.4%.  
20 See Wolfe and Haveman (2002) for a comprehensive overview of these social spillovers from 
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return to education. However, the literature has identified a number of reasons why education 
policy designed to reduce income inequality may be counterproductive.
21 One reason is that a 
larger relative stock of skilled workers may induce the development of new technologies that 
are more complementary to skilled workers. If this mechanism is at work, stimulating skill 
formation with education policy does not only lead to an increased supply of skilled workers, 
but also to an increased (relative) demand for skilled workers.   
3.1.2  Effects of education policy 
How does policy affect education, and thereby the accumulation of human capital?
22 There are 
basically two channels through which education policy can operate: through educational 
quantity or through the impact on educational quality. Educational quantity is usually expressed 
in enrolment levels or average years of schooling. Educational quality has been traditionally 
measured by input measures such as teacher-student ratios, teachers’ human capital or total 
public expenditures on education. A more recent strategy, however, is to evaluate educational 
quality in terms of output indicators measuring the performance of students and graduates. 
Towards this end, test scores in areas like maths, reading and science are often used. The idea is 
that when students in one country outperform students in another, provided they are in the same 
grade, we can assume that they have enjoyed schooling of higher quality, irrespective whether 
this higher quality comes from higher teacher-student ratios, the quality of teachers, other 
expenditures on education or other unobservable factors specific to the production of human 
capital.  
There exists a rich empirical literature in which measurements of educational quantity (e.g. 
average years of schooling) as well as educational quality (e.g. test scores) are taken as the 
determinants of macroeconomic performance, which is usually expressed in the level of GDP 
per capita and/or its growth rate. See Section 2.2.6 for a discussion of the main outcomes of this 
literature. The apparent relationship between the state of an educational system and 
macroeconomic performance makes the question as to how policy affects the quantity and 
quality of education all the more relevant.  
Table 3.1 presents a brief overview of the outcomes of studies measuring the causal effect of 
various types of public interventions.
23 We distinguish among the effects on enrolment levels 
(i.e. the quantity channel) and measurements of student performance (i.e. the quality channel). 
Besides categorising education policies according to their particular focus (i.e. quantity versus 
quality), we also subdivide educational interventions according to the different stages of the 
education career in which they are carried out. To this end, we distinguish among interventions 
during pre-compulsory schooling (or early childhood interventions), compulsory schooling (i.e. 
primary and secondary education), and post-compulsory schooling (i.e. tertiary education), as 
indicated in the first column of table 3.1. Thus, in the presence of a government education 
                                                      
21 It is not our goal to discuss these reasons here. For a comprehensive overview of factors that undermine 
the effectiveness of education policies in reducing wage inequality, the reader is referred to Jacobs 
(2004). 
22 The macroeconomic impact of education policy in terms of productivity and economic growth will not 
be discussed here. Instead, we have chosen a two-step methodology: this section shows how policy 
inflicts on (the quantity and quality of) education, whereas Section 2.2.6 shows how education, or more 
broadly seen, human capital may affect macroeconomic outcomes such as productivity and economic 
growth.    
23 In this paper, we are only interested in the main effects of various interventions in terms of enrolment 
and student performance. A more in-depth analysis of the outcomes of these evaluation studies is already 
carried out in Webbink (2005) and Webbink and Hassink (2002). HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 21 
 
budget constraint, aside from the choice of a particular type of intervention (i.e. how to 
intervene?), policymakers are also concerned with the timing of educational interventions (i.e. 
when to intervene?).  
How can the effects of a particular intervention be measured? Unfortunately, convincing policy 
evaluation studies are scarce. Much of the traditional evaluation literature does not fulfil the 
requirements of internal validity, in the sense that so-called endogeneity bias is present.
24 In 
table 3.1, we have confined ourselves to a presentation of studies using a (quasi-)experimental 
design. These studies exploit exogenous variation in interventions in education produced by 
natural or controlled experiments to evaluate their impact, thereby correcting for endogeneity of 
educational inputs.
25 In the design of new policy, one could take into account the possibilities 
for a proper evaluation based on natural or controlled experiments. This is helpful to evaluate 
the causal impact of policy some time after its implementation (so-called ex post policy 
evaluation). Such a strategy should therefore enable evidence-based policy design in the future. 
What can we learn from table 3.1?
26 First, it appears from table 3.1 that the vast majority of 
interventions are designed to affect educational quality. This can be explained as follows. Some 
interventions of which the impact on educational quality is reported in table 3.1 may indeed 
have affected (or were designed to affect) educational quantity as well, but then its impact was 
not studied. A more profound reason is that the studies presented in table 3.1 evaluate the 
effectiveness of interventions carried out in advanced economies only, mostly in the US, and 
not in developing countries. Since advanced economies have often reached the upper limits of 
enrolment, at least in primary and -though somewhat less - in secondary education, (recent) 
public interventions in these countries are focused mostly on improving educational quality.
27 In 
other words, contrary to developing countries, the scope for raising enrolment or average years 
of education is relatively limited in developed countries.
28 
A second conclusion from table 3.1 is that early childhood interventions appear to be relatively 
more effective, both in terms of raising average years of education, as well as in improving 
student performance. When modelling early childhood interventions in a macro model, 
however, it is important to realise that the time lag between the intervention and labour market 
entrance of the students targeted with it is much longer than in the case of interventions during 
compulsory schooling, or (even more significant) during post-compulsory schooling. This 
means that the macroeconomic benefits of early childhood interventions, if any, materialise in 
the long term.  
Third, considering interventions in the stage of compulsory and post-compulsory schooling, the 
picture arising from table 3.1 is mixed. The effectiveness of interventions in these stages of the 
education life-cycle differ not only across different types of interventions (e.g. extensions of 
instruction time appear to be more effective than more computer facilities), but also within a 
certain class of interventions (e.g. a larger class size, or performance incentives for students in 
                                                      
24 The key question in internal validity is whether observed changes in outcomes can be attributed to the 
intervention (i.e. the cause) and not to other possible causes. 
25 For a more in-depth discussion of the problems of measuring causal effects of educational 
interventions, the reader is referred to Webbink (2005). 
26 We are mainly interested in its implications for simulations of interventions in a macro model. 
27 In the Netherlands for instance, 92% of all people aged 16 were engaged in full-time education in the 
year 2000 (89% in 1980), and that of 18-year olds amounted to 64% (46% in 1980), whereas enrolment of 
24-year olds stood at 17% (9% in 1980) (SCP, 2004).  
28 This is not to deny that there is still some potential to raise educational quantity in industrialised 
countries, for instance by raising enrolment in tertiary education, or by lowering dropout rates in 
secondary education, that are in some cases substantial. 22 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
higher education). Effects found in one program need not occur when exactly the same program 
is implemented in another city, region, country, on a larger scale, or in another time period. 
Furthermore, differences in program design and execution could also be an explanation for 
contrasting results within a certain class of interventions.  
A final remark is that a cost-benefit analysis is absent in most evaluation studies presented in 
Table 3.1. Some interventions may yield positive effects in terms of improvements in student 
performance or enrolment, but may have considerable costs due to the large expenditures 
incurred in those programs. Moreover, as argued by Carneiro and Heckman (2003), for many 
large-scale interventions it is essential to account for general equilibrium effects that reverse or 
diminish partial equilibrium effects. 
Table 3.1 Effectiveness of public interventions in education by type and level (based on studies 
with an (quasi-) experimental approach)  
Timing 
(level) 
Intervention (type) + country
3 Literature  Effect 
Quality
7 
Effect 
Quantity
7 
Pre- 
Compulsory 
      
  early childhood interventions       
  several pre-school intervention programs 
(e.g. full-day child care, home visits, 
pre-school program) (US) 
Heckman (2000);Currie 
(2001)
5 
+ +
16 
Compulsory
1        
  ‘classical’ education inputs       
  instruction time (school hours) 
- Israel 
- NL 
- Sweden 
 
Lavy (1999a) 
Leuven et al. (2004a) 
Lindahl (2001) 
 
+ 
+
8 
+  
 
  expenditure per pupil (US)  Guryan (2001)  n.s./+
9  
  class size reduction 
- Israel 
- NL 
- US 
- US 
- US 
- various countries 
 
Angrist and Lavy 
(1999) 
Dobbelsteen et al. 
(2002) 
Krueger (1999, 2003) 
Hoxby (2000a) 
Krueger and Whitmore 
(2001) 
Wöβmann and West 
(2005) 
 
+ 
n.s. 
+ 
n.s.  
+ 
n.s./+
10 
 
  teacher training/acquisition  
- Israel 
- US   
teacher testing/certification (US) 
 
Angrist and Lavy 
(2001) 
Jacob and Lefgren 
(2004a) 
Angrist and Guryan 
(2003) 
 
n.s./+
11 
n.s. 
n.s.
12 
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Table 3.1 Continued 
 computer  facilities 
- in elementary and middle schools 
(Israel) 
- in primary schools (NL) 
internet investment subsidy 
 
Angrist and Lavy 
(2002a) 
Leuven et al. (2004b) 
Goolsbee and Guryan 
(2002) 
 
n.s. 
- 
n.s. 
 
 organisational  changes       
  school-going age extension (Sweden)  Meghir and Palme 
(1999) 
 + 
  competition (vouchers/school choice)  
- US 
- US 
- US 
 
Hoxby (2002) 
Cullen et al. (2003) 
Krueger and Zhu (2003) 
 
+ 
n.s. 
n.s. 
 
 performance  incentives
4  
- merit pay for teachers (Israel) 
- merit pay for schools (Israel) 
 
Lavy (2003) 
Lavy (2002) 
 
+ 
+ 
 
  
n.s.
17 
  peer group (changes in class 
heterogeneity)   
- Israel  
- US 
 
Lavy (1999b) 
Hoxby (2000b) 
 
+ 
+ 
 
  teachers’ grading standards (US)  Figlio and Lucas (2000)  +   
  specific projects for students at risk 
- cash bonus for high school 
matriculation 
  for low-achieving students (Israel) 
- additional instruction to 
underperforming students (Israel) 
- funding for extra personnel for primary  
  schools with disadvantaged students 
- student counselling and financial 
   incentives for minority students (US) 
- several dropout prevention programs 
(US) 
- remedial summer education (US) 
 
Angrist and Lavy 
(2002b) 
 
Lavy and Schlosser 
(2004) 
 
Leuven et al. (2004b) 
 
Taggart (1995); 
Heckman (2000) 
Dynarski et al. (1998)6 
Jacob and Lefgren 
(2004b) 
 
+ 
 
n.s./+
13 
 
n.s. 
 
+ 
 
n.s.  
n.s./+
14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
n.s.  
Post- 
Compulsory
2  
      
 tuition  fees   
- US 
- US 
- US 
 
Heckman et al. (1998), 
Cameron and Heckman 
(2001) Dynarski (1999) 
 
 
 
– (0.07)
18 
– (0.02-
0.05)
18 
– (0.03)
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Table 3.1 Continued 
  financial support (loans/ grants) 
- California college grant program (US) 
- social security student benefit (US)  
- SOFES loan program (Mexico) 
 
Kane (2003) 
Dynarski (1999) 
Canton and Blom (2004) 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
 
 performance  incentives for students 
- reward for 1st year college 
completion(NL) 
- performance-based grant system (NL) 
 
Leuven et al. (2003) 
Belot et al. (2004) 
 
n.s./+
15 
+ 
 
 
Notes: 
1.  Primary and secondary education. 
2.  Tertiary education. 
3.  US = United States, NL =Netherlands. 
4.  The reader is referred to Canton and Webbink (2004) for a discussion of evaluations of interventions based on 
performance incentives. 
5.  Heckman and Currie have reviewed several (quasi-)experimental evaluation studies of various early childhood 
intervention schemes.   
6.  Dynarski et al. (1998) have reviewed sixteen dropout prevention programs carried out in the US, of which eight 
middle-school programs and eight high-school programs. These programs were generally ineffective in lowering 
the dropout rate or improving student performance. However, some positive results were found for a limited 
number of intensive middle school programs and for high school GED programs. 
7.  + significant positive effect on performance; n.s. no effect; - significant negative effect on performance. 
8.  Positive effects on test scores apply only to pupils with lower educated parents and minority children. 
9.  Test scores are positively affected for 4th-grade students, but increased spending showed no effect on 8th-grade 
test scores  
10.  Class-size effects are estimated on mathematics and science achievement in 18 countries. Significant positive 
effects of smaller class size were found for only two countries (Iceland and Greece). Wöβmann and West (2005) 
conclude that class-size effects in one school system cannot be interpreted as a general finding for all school 
systems. 
11.  Positive effects are found for secular schools, but effects on student performance in religious schools are 
insignificant. 
12.  Effects have been studied on teacher quality as an indirect measure of educational quality.  
13.  Remedial education improved the performance of sixth graders, but not of third graders. 
14.  Cash bonuses for high school matriculation (this is a prerequisite for university admission) are effective when 
provided to an entire school, but not when given to individually selected students within the school. 
15.  Positive effects are found for students with high math skills and for students with higher educated fathers when 
given a ‘high’ reward.  
16.  The quantity effect of early childhood interventions refers to the direct effect on average years of schooling due 
to the extra classes in the pre-school stage, but also to the indirect effect caused by increased high school 
graduation rates and/or lower dropout rates.  
17.  The quantity effect refers to the impact on the dropout rate.  
18.  Presented numbers are enrolment elasticities.  
Sources: Partly adapted from Webbink and Hassink (2002); Webbink (2005). 
 
3.1.3 Conclusions 
When modelling education in a macro context, one should take account of: 
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•  Effects on income distribution; 
•  Varying effects by education level in terms of size and type; 
•  Possibly decreasing returns to the expansion of education;
29 
•  A distinction between the quantity and quality component of education; 
•  Bounded growth of educational quantity (particularly in developed countries); 
•  In principle unbounded growth of educational quality. 
When modelling education policy in a macro-context, one should take account of the following 
notions: 
•  A distinction between policies aimed at raising enrolment or average years of education 
(quantity) and policies aimed at raising student performance (quality) could be workable; 
•  Timing of intervention matters: pre-school interventions appear to be more effective than 
interventions in later stages of the education cycle;
30  
•  The type of intervention under consideration matters as well: at each stage of the education 
cycle the government can mostly choose from a whole menu of interventions. 
Measurements of effectiveness vary not only between different types of interventions, but 
also within a certain class of interventions (class-size reductions for example).  
•  Macroeconomic effects of interventions in the early stage of the education life cycle in 
terms of labour market outcomes materialise much later than effects of interventions in for 
instance tertiary education. 
3.2  Research and development 
In the previous subsection, we have discussed the impact of government policy on human 
capital. Here we will focus on another important factor in terms of its potential impact on the 
process of economic growth, notably research and development (R&D). The outline of this 
section is as follows. First, in Section 3.2.1 we briefly discuss the rationale for public 
intervention in R&D, both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Subsequently, 
Section 3.2.2 reviews the most important policy instruments in the area of R&D and sheds some 
light on their effectiveness. Section 3.2.3 concludes. 
3.2.1  Rationale for public intervention in research and development 
Several market failures have been identified in economic theory as a justification for public 
interference with R&D (e.g. Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Jaffe, 1996). Most often mentioned are 
external effects, capital market constraints following from asymmetries in information between 
capital markets and R&D spenders, and insurance market imperfections.
31  
                                                      
29 As mentioned by Sianesi and Van Reenen (2002), the incremental value of additional education in 
countries where average length of education is already high is less obvious, and probably depends largely 
on the type and quality of education. 
30 Another argument in favour of early interventions in education is that early investments raise the 
productivity of later investments, as argued by Carneiro and Heckman (2003): ‘Learning begets learning, 
skills (both cognitive and non-cognitive) acquired early on facilitate later learning’. 
31 Information asymmetries (about the quality of planned R&D projects) between providers of capital and 
firms engaged in R&D may lead to moral hazard problems and adverse selection. We refer to Canton et 
al. (2005) for a more detailed analysis of capital market imperfections in the market for R&D. Insurance 26 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
Let us briefly focus on R&D spillovers.
32 The theoretical literature discerns several channels 
along which R&D spills over from one firm, sector or country to another, both positive and 
negative. We can distinguish among the following two types of positive R&D spillovers, due to 
which incentives of companies to invest in R&D may be too weak (relative to the social 
optimum): 
•  Knowledge spillovers: the revenue from R&D is (technological) knowledge. This 
knowledge has, at least to some extent, features of a public good: it is non-rivalrous and 
only partially non-excludable. Once invented, other companies, both competitors and 
companies operating in other sectors (e.g. suppliers), may imitate ideas produced by the 
innovating company.
33 The standing on the shoulders of giants effect of knowledge 
spillovers benefits other firms through knowledge leaks, imperfect patenting and movement 
of skilled labour to other firms (cf. Cameron, 1998). However, as emphasised by Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989), acquiring the results of other firms’ R&D requires research effort (and 
costs) by the recipient firm. Rather than thinking of R&D (knowledge) spillovers as 
exogenous, a firm needs to invest in its absorptive capacity (i.e. the firm’s ability to 
identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge developed elsewhere) in order to gain from 
knowledge spillovers from other firms. Leahy and Neary (2004) specify a model of the 
absorptive capacity process and show that this costly absorption, while raising the returns to 
own R&D, lowers the effective spillover coefficient.
34  
•  Rent (or surplus) spillovers: the firm carrying out R&D is not able to appropriate the entire 
consumer surplus associated with the good it creates. Full appropriation would only be 
possible if the innovating firm can price discriminate perfectly to downstream users 
(Cameron, 1998). However, a firm cannot charge every customer the maximum price each 
customer is willing to pay. This implies that downstream industries or consumers benefit 
from R&D efforts by upstream industries. Also, the importance of these rent spillovers 
increases with the intensity of competition, as in a perfectly competitive market consumers 
are able to capture the entire surplus.  
On the other hand, theory also identifies two negative types of R&D spillovers, potentially 
leading to private overinvestment in R&D: 
•  Business stealing effect: new ideas resulting from R&D efforts by one company can make 
existent production processes and products of competitive firms obsolete, even if these new 
ideas are only marginally better. This process of Schumpeterian creative destruction may 
cause the current innovator to receive the entire flow of rents, while the past innovator is 
forced out of the market. The resulting profit loss of the past innovator is not internalised by 
                                                                                                                                                             
market imperfections arise when firms are unable to insure themselves against the risks involved in R&D 
investments, neither by building up a sufficiently diversified research portfolio nor by contracts with 
insurance companies. Ceteris paribus, both market failures lead to underinvestment in R&D relative to 
what is socially optimal.   
32 For a more comprehensive review of the R&D spillover literature, the reader is referred to Griliches 
(1992) and Cameron (1996). Our goal here is just to present the main (theoretical) arguments for 
government intervention in the market for R&D.  
33 However, intellectual property rights and delays in the dissemination of ideas enable the innovator to 
appropriate a share of the rents from a new idea. 
34 Moreover, Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that own R&D’s contribution to a firm’s absorptive 
capacity (i.e. the “second face of R&D”) has an important implication for R&D policy, notably, that the 
negative incentive effects of intra-industry knowledge spillovers (i.e. underinvestment in R&D) may not 
be as great as supposed. This means that the benefits of policies designed to mitigate these negative 
incentive effects, such as patent policies, may be not as great as generally assumed either. HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 27 
 
the current innovator. This business stealing effect may raise private incentives to invest in 
R&D relative to social incentives. The fact that the past innovator takes into account the 
possibility of dynamic competition (i.e. being forced out of the market) in its decision to 
innovate does not make this argument invalid (Aghion and Howitt, 1992).  
•  Duplication externality (or congestion externality): companies are sometimes engaged in 
patent races, in which multiple firms run parallel R&D programs in the hope of being the 
first to succeed in patenting a new good or process (Jones and Williams, 2000). This 
duplication of research efforts is also called the stepping on toes effect, and it reduces the 
average productivity of R&D in an economy.  
If positive R&D spillovers dominate negative externalities, leaving aside other market failures, 
the social rate of return will exceed the private rate of return to R&D. In that case we can state 
that there is private underinvestment in R&D (relative to the social optimum).
35  
What does the empirical literature tell us? The majority of studies finds that social returns 
substantially exceed private returns to R&D at current levels of public intervention, so that 
(positive) R&D spillovers are both prevalent and important (cf. Griliches, 1992; Nadiri, 1993; 
Jones and Williams, 1998; Cameron, 1998, Canton, 2002). Jones and Williams (1998) even 
argue that conservative estimates of R&D spillovers (i.e. the discrepancy between social and 
private returns to R&D) suggest that optimal R&D investment in the US is at least four times 
actual investment.
36  
If the available estimates of the social and private returns to R&D are true, this would imply that 
current levels of public interference with R&D are too low. Stated otherwise, these large 
spillovers would justify a reallocation of public funds to R&D. However, as already noted in 
Section 2.3.5, the high social and private returns to R&D found in the literature are not 
undisputed and should be treated with caution. Nonetheless, there would appear to be at least 
some scope for additional social gains from increased public interference with R&D. The 
potential benefits of an interference should be compared to the costs (higher taxes and 
government failure). 
In addition to the question how much R&D should be stimulated, the government also needs to 
decide what type of R&D can best be promoted. It is important to realise that R&D is a 
heterogeneous phenomenon, and that rates of return on R&D and the size of spillovers may vary 
across different types of R&D. The main findings, as summarised in OECD (2003), are as 
follows. First, the returns to process R&D are higher than the returns to product R&D. Second, 
rates of return on private R&D are much higher than those on public financed R&D. Third, 
basic R&D generally yields higher returns than applied R&D. Fourth, returns to R&D vary 
                                                      
35 However, there is the possibility that existing policies have already internalised R&D spillovers, 
thereby eliminating the gap between the social and private rate of return that would have existed in the 
absence of any policy intervention. Moreover, there is also a risk of (over-) internalisation of R&D 
spillovers due to institutions initiated by the market. Examples of these institutions are patents, 
technology licenses, and R&D-cooperation of firms (i.e. research joint ventures) (cf. Leahy and Neary, 
1999; Kamien and Zang, 2000). 
36 Jones and Williams (1998) have derived an endogenous growth model in the spirit of Romer (1990), 
which incorporates all four of the earlier mentioned R&D externalities, notably knowledge spillovers, rent 
spillovers, the stepping on toes effect, and creative destruction. In a more recent paper, Jones and 
Williams (2000) develop a different endogenous growth model, this time in the tradition of Stokey 
(1995), in which they incorporate the same four distortions to R&D to tackle the issue of over- or 
underinvestment in R&D. Again they find that there is typically underinvestment in R&D relative to what 
is socially optimal, unless duplication externalities are very large and the equilibrium real interest rate is 
extremely high.  28 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
between industries, with R&D in research-intensive sectors having higher returns. Finally, the 
size of R&D spillovers appears to depend not only on the type of R&D, but also on 
geographical distance to the firm carrying out R&D. As argued by Cameron (1998), R&D 
spillovers tend to be localised, with foreign economies gaining significantly less from domestic 
innovation than other domestic firms.
37  
These observations have important policy implications not only for the types of R&D that 
governments should promote, but also, on the issue of the magnitude of foreign R&D spillovers, 
whether policy should be aimed at assimilating foreign technologies rather than stimulating 
domestic investment in R&D. 
3.2.2  Effects of R&D policy 
Apart from the legitimacy of R&D policy, we are interested in two other issues. First, what 
instruments may governments use to affect the level and/or the average (social) rate of return to 
R&D in the economy? And second, is it possible to draw some general conclusions about the 
(relative) effectiveness of these instruments from the empirical literature? Whereas there is a 
rich literature on the first question, the second question is somewhat more complicated. Good 
ex-post evaluation studies of the various R&D policy instruments, that is, studies with a (quasi-
)experimental design, are scarce.
38 Cornet and Van de Ven (2004) argue that policy 
experiments, in which some (randomly chosen) firms are disposed to a certain treatment, may 
yield interesting insights into the effectiveness of R&D policies.
39  
Policy instruments 
Let us turn to the first question and start with an overview of the various instruments 
governments generally use to affect the level of R&D investment in the economy, either directly 
or more indirectly. The level of R&D investments depends on the quality of basic institutions, 
such as patent systems or the financial sector. This implies that there is a role for policy in these 
areas. However, we restrict ourselves to the following categories of policy instruments:  
•  Fiscal incentives (i.e. R&D tax credits); 
                                                      
37 This does not imply that domestic firms do not profit from foreign R&D. There is some debate, 
however, on the impact of foreign R&D knowledge on domestic productivity (relative to domestic R&D 
spillovers), as well as the mechanisms through which this occurs. Coe and Helpman (1995), for example, 
in a sample for 22 OECD countries, find that foreign R&D has a positive and quantitatively large effect 
on domestic productivity, and argue that these international R&D spillovers are stronger the more open an 
economy is to foreign trade. Keller (1998), however, questions the assumption that international trade 
flows are the (main) channel of foreign technology diffusion. Keller uses random shares to create the 
counterfactual foreign knowledge stock instead of the bilateral import shares used by Coe and Helpman, 
and finds similarly high coefficients and levels of explained variation in productivity. Furthermore, two 
country studies on international R&D spillovers are worth mentioning. First, Jacobs et al. (2002) find 
evidence for spillovers from foreign R&D in the Netherlands, but these are small relative to domestic 
inter-industry spillovers (TFP elasticities are 3 and 15%, respectively). Second, Griffith et al. (2004) show 
that US-based R&D positively affected total factor productivity of UK firms in the 1990s, and that these 
spillovers were larger in industries whose TFP gap with the US was greater. The reader is referred to 
Cincera and Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) and Keller (2004) for an elaborate survey of both macro 
and micro level studies of international R&D spillovers. 
38 Examples of studies with a (quasi-)experimental design in the area of education are shown in Section 
3.1.2.   
39 These kinds of experiments are very common for evaluating the effectiveness of new medicines for 
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•  Public funding of private-performed R&D (e.g. public grants, government procurement 
contracts);
40 
•  Public performed R&D (e.g. public research laboratories; university research); 
•  ‘Framework’ policy (e.g. education policy, competition policy, labour market policy, trade 
policy).
41 
These factors are under direct control of the government and are easier to incorporate in macro-
models than for instance patent laws or financial sector regulations. The first two instruments 
are  directly targeted at stimulating business R&D. Fiscal incentives and public funding of 
private performed R&D directly lower the costs of research of firms.
42 On the other hand, 
research carried out in public research laboratories and in universities lower the costs and 
uncertainty of private research in a more indirect way, for instance by helping firms to 
understand the technological opportunities that are available (cf. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 
de la Potterie, 2003).
43  
Finally, the fourth category of policy instruments (i.e. framework policy) contains policies that 
have no direct focus on R&D, but that may play an important role in affecting the level (or 
productivity) of R&D activity indirectly. Let us briefly discuss the interactions between R&D 
and policy in the two other main areas discussed in this chapter, that is, education and 
competition. First consider education policy. Scientists and engineers can be seen as the main 
input for R&D. This implies that, in addition to policies aimed at raising R&D activity from the 
demand side, there is a potential role for (higher) education policy in stimulating R&D activity 
from the supply side by increasing the supply of scientists and engineers. Supply side 
constraints may arise from a relatively inelastic supply of scientists and engineers, reflecting the 
time to acquire the necessary human capital.
44 A more general argument for the importance of 
education policy is that empirical studies show a strong interaction between human capital and 
R&D. Economic theory has also made clear that human capital and R&D activity are 
complements: R&D is more effective the more skilled the labour force is (cf. Redding, 1996; 
Goldin and Katz, 1998; Bucci, 2003).  
A second example of framework policies is competition policy. It is widely believed that the 
degree of competition in a market affects the incentives for firms to innovate, and, thus, to 
                                                      
40 Government procurement contracts generally are financial outlays to procure research results that are 
expected to assist the public agency in better defining and fulfilling its mission objectives. Examples can 
be found in public aerospace or defense. Public grants are the primary mechanism for funding exploratory 
research for the advancement of knowledge and fostering emerging technologies (cf. David et al., 2000).   
41 We have labelled this category framework policy, because it refers to policy of which the principal 
focus is not to stimulate R&D activity in the economy.    
42 The primary difference in execution between these two policy instruments is that tax incentives 
typically allow the private firms to choose projects, whereas direct subsidies for R&D are often 
accompanied by a government directed choice, either because the government spends the funds directly, 
or because the funds are distributed via grants to firms for specific projects or research areas (David et al., 
2000). 
43 Moreover, stimulating business R&D is generally not the only or the principal goal of research carried 
out in public research laboratories and universities. For example, universities may carry out research 
projects that yield significant social returns, but in which the private sector shows no interest. The wedge 
between private and social returns is likely to be highest in basic research (i.e., the type of research 
typically carried out in universities), rather than in applied research. 
44 An example of the importance of education policy in shaping the conditions for effective R&D policy 
is provided by Romer (2000). He argues that existing institutional arrangements in higher education in the 
US have limited the supply response of scientists and engineers that was necessary to make the R&D 
subsidies work that stimulated private sector demand of scientists and engineers. 30 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
engage in R&D activities. This implies that competition policy may be used to affect the level 
of R&D that is undertaken in certain markets. However, the recent literature shows that the 
relationship between competition and innovation (and hence, R&D) is not unambiguous. 
Different effects may work against each other (e.g. the escape competition effect and the 
Schumpeterian (surplus appropriability) effect, cf. Aghion et al., 2002). It is not clear which 
effect dominates in a particular market with a certain degree of competition.
45 This has 
implications for the optimal design of competition policy, at least if it is to stimulate innovation, 
and implicitly, the level of R&D activity. 
Effectiveness of R&D policy 
The effectiveness of R&D policy can be evaluated by two indicators. The first indicator is the 
aggregate amount of R&D activity.
46 Stated otherwise, how much additional R&D is stimulated 
by one dollar of government money? The second indicator is the marginal (social) rate of return 
to R&D. What is the productivity of these additional R&D investments? It should be noticed 
that the majority of evaluation studies only focuses on the additionality of R&D policy, and not 
so much on its impact on the social rate of return to R&D. 
A priori, the theoretical impact of government policy is not evident. Let us first consider the 
impact of government policy on the level of R&D activity. There are several reasons why policy 
instruments do not always lead to additional (private) R&D, and hence effectiveness may be 
lowered:
47 
•  Substitution; 
•  Input price effect; 
•  Fungibility.  
First, public funded R&D may complement private R&D by providing knowledge that is 
helpful to firms. This will stimulate private R&D. However, it may also directly substitute for 
private funding of R&D projects that would have been undertaken anyway in the absence of this 
public funded R&D. 
Second, government R&D policy may also crowd out private R&D indirectly by increasing the 
demand of R&D, which may lead to higher costs of research inputs, and hence, a lower rate of 
return. This crowding out effect will become more significant the more inelastic the supply of 
research inputs. Goolsbee (1998) mentions that the majority of R&D spending is just salary 
payments for R&D workers. Because their labour supply is quite inelastic, he argues, a 
significant fraction of government funding of R&D goes directly into higher wages of 
researchers.
48 When faced with these higher research costs, firms shift their funding to 
                                                      
45 Aghion et al. (2002) develop a Schumpeterian growth model predicting that the relationship between 
product market competition and innovation has an inverted U-shape. The main idea is that, at low levels 
of competition, the escape competition effect dominates, and more competition leads to higher incentives 
to innovate (in order to take the lead over your rivals), whereas at high levels of competition, the 
Schumpeterian effect dominates, such that more competition reduces incentives to innovate. Aghion et al. 
(2002) have confronted the prediction of this inverted U-relationship with UK firm level data on 
competition and innovation activities (measured both, by the amount of patents and by R&D spending), 
and seem to find empirical support for this prediction. However, the empirical literature on this issue is 
still thin and developing, so that strong conclusions are unwarranted at the moment...  
46 The amount of R&D activity, or the volume of R&D investments, should be distinguished from R&D 
expenditures, in the sense that the latter also carries a price component.  
47 We refer to Cornet and Van de Ven (2004) for a more extensive treatment of this issue. 
48 The reader is referred to Jacobs and Webbink (2004) for a discussion of the current labour market 
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alternative investments. This implies that, even if government funding raises the total amount of 
R&D expenditures in the economy, the real amount of R&D activity (adjusted for the higher 
cost of research) increases less. Goolsbee states that, because of this wage effect, conventional 
estimates of the effectiveness of R&D policy may be 30 to 50% too high.
49 
A third reason why R&D policy may not lead to additional R&D is that part of the reported 
R&D expenditures may just be a re-labelling of existing activities to R&D, so as to make them 
qualify for policy instruments such as tax deductions. This is also called fungibility. 
Besides having an ambiguous impact on the level of R&D, government policy may also change 
the composition of R&D, and, thereby, the average (social) rate of return to R&D. For instance, 
public R&D may perfectly substitute for private R&D, thereby leaving total R&D unaffected. 
Yet, the average impact of R&D may be lowered if the return to this additional public R&D is 
lower than the return to private R&D. In an ideal situation, policy triggers research projects with 
the highest social rate of return. However, two factors may limit the effectiveness of R&D 
policy in this respect: lack of information on part of the government about the social returns to 
R&D of particular projects, and the pressure of lobby groups (cf. Cornet and Van de Ven, 
2004). This may lead to government support of undesirable R&D projects, that is, projects with 
a low social rate of return.  
Above, we have sketched some theoretical arguments showing how the effectiveness of R&D 
policies may be lowered. Whereas it is useful to understand these mechanisms, simulating R&D 
policies in a macro model requires insights in how effective these policies really are. Is it 
possible to derive some general conclusions from the available empirical studies?  
The majority of evaluation studies of R&D policy has focused either on the effectiveness of 
fiscal incentives (e.g. Mohnen, 1999; Hall and Van Reenen, 2000), or on the impact of public 
funding of private performed R&D (e.g. Capron and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1997; 
David et al., 2000, Garcia-Quevedo, 2004). Much less is known about the effects of public 
performed research on private R&D activity, that is, research conducted in government labs or 
universities.
50  
Most of the available evaluation studies of R&D programs have not been based on 
microeconomic techniques, but instead on case studies and interviews with project managers. 
These kinds of studies suffer from the objection that the results are often not representative or 
(upward) biased, as argued by Klette et al. (2000). Evaluation studies based on controlled or 
natural experiments are rather scarce.
51 With respect to the findings reported below, it should be 
                                                      
49 Marey and Borghans (2000) have estimated this wage effect for the Netherlands. They find that one 
euro additional expenditure on business R&D increases wages by 20 to 30 eurocents. 
50 If studied, the effectiveness of the various instruments is often studied separately. However, 
instruments are generally used simultaneously, and it is important to take account of interactions between 
the instruments. For instance, those policies affecting applied research, such as R&D tax credits, may 
enhance the efficiency of instruments oriented towards basic research, as they may strengthen the 
absorptive capacity of recipient firms. As argued by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), the different 
tools thus constitute a system, and their efficiency can best be captured by analysing the system as a 
whole.  
51 As mentioned by Klette et al. (2000), evaluating the impact of R&D policies, one has to face the 
question of what would have taken place without the program, and this makes it an exercise in 
counterfactual analysis. Consider for instance large scale R&D subsidy programs. Neither the firms 
receiving support, nor those applying can be considered random draws. Public authorities may be more 
inclined to support firms that are already carrying out R&D and that have good innovative ideas. 
Constructing a valid control group in this setting is quite challenging. Klette et al. (2000) conclude that a 
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stressed that in all studies there is a lot of unexplained variation in the estimated returns or 
elasticities. This is due to the heterogeneity of the empirical models used (e.g. regarding time 
periods, data sources, the level of aggregation (e.g. firms, industries, countries), and 
econometric techniques). Furthermore, it may reflect differences in the effectiveness of R&D 
programs, which are all very specific in nature. This makes it difficult to simulate a specific 
government program in a macro-model. Whereas it is not our purpose to discuss all the ins and 
outs of the results found in the empirical literature, let us summarise the main findings. 
Fiscal incentives 
The effectiveness of fiscal incentives to stimulate private R&D is measured by the so-called tax 
price elasticity. This indicator can be interpreted as the amount of additional R&D that is 
generated by one dollar of tax deduction. As could be expected, there is a good deal of variety in 
econometric estimates of this tax price elasticity, ranging from 0.1 to 2. In a review of the 
literature, Hall and Van Reenen (2000), however, conclude that the most plausible estimates of 
the tax price elasticity are around unity, which signifies that each dollar forgone in tax credit for 
R&D stimulates a dollar of additional R&D. Mohnen (1999, p.12) has also reviewed the 
existing econometric estimates of the tax price elasticity: “The existing evidence about the 
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, although it is mixed, seems to tilt towards the conclusion 
that they are not terribly effective in stimulating more R&D than the amount of tax revenues 
foregone.” Finally, Bloom et al. (2000) estimate an econometric model using panel data on tax 
changes and R&D spending in eight industrialised countries to examine the impact of R&D tax 
credits on the level of R&D investment. They find that, in the short-run, a 10% fall in the cost of 
R&D stimulates 1% additional R&D, whereas in the long run, R&D increases by over 10%.  
Is there any empirical evidence on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in the Netherlands? 
The most important government program to stimulate private R&D activity in the Netherlands 
is the WBSO, a wage tax credit for R&D labour.
52 The WBSO is a generic instrument, for 
which about three-quarters of all companies engaged in R&D in the Netherlands apply 
(Brouwer et al., 2003). Estimates of the effectiveness in terms of the extra amount of R&D 
activity generated by one Euro of this wage tax credit vary. Brouwer et al. (2003) find a tax 
price elasticity of unity on the basis of an instrumental variable analysis. Bureau Bartels (1998) 
use another methodology by conducting interviews with managers of the firms that received the 
wage tax credit. This study finds that only two-thirds of the WBSO subsidy was spent on 
additional R&D. 
Cornet (2001), however, lists four arguments why the additionality of the WBSO may be 
overestimated in the literature: substitution, fungibility (or re-labelling), the input price (or 
wage) effect, and selection effects.
53 The first three effects have been explained earlier. 
Selection effects may occur because firms generally propose those projects with the highest 
expected returns. Taking into account the uncertainty about the size of these effects, Cornet 
(2001) arrives at about 50 percent as a lower bound for the additionality of the WBSO, and 
about 100 percent as an upper bound. In addition, Cornet argues that a full cost-benefit analysis 
requires knowledge of the social rate of return on the extra R&D induced by the instrument, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the recent advances in the evaluation literature in labour market econometrics (e.g. Heckman et al., 1998; 
Angrist and Krueger, 1999).  
52 The abbreviation WBSO stands for ‘Wet vermindering afdracht loonBelasting en premie 
volksverzekeringen, onderdeel Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk’, which means: Reduction of contributions 
wage taxes and social insurance act, part research and development.  
53 Cornet (2001) supposed on the basis of the scare empirical literature that the fungibility and the input 
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which is difficult to measure.
54 This lack of knowledge on the size of these crucial impact 
parameters (i.e. additionality, and the social rate of return on additional R&D) complicates 
simulations of tax incentive schemes (or, in fact, any other R&D policy program) in a macro 
model.
55 
Public funding of private performed R&D 
The relevant question when determining the effectiveness of public funding of R&D is whether 
it complements private R&D activity or substitutes for private performed R&D. The literature is 
not unambiguous on this issue.
56 Let us discuss the main findings.  
David et al. (2000) find that one third (11 out of 33) of the empirical studies they review report 
net substitution of public funded R&D for private R&D. Garcia-Quevedo (2004) finds that a 
little less than one quarter (17 out of 74) of the reviewed studies report substitutability.
57 Both 
David et al. and Garcia-Quevedo find that substitution is far more prevalent among the studies 
conducted at the firm level, than among those carried out at the industry or country level.
58 
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) find that one dollar of public funding of 
private performed R&D by means of grants or public contracting stimulates 0.70 dollar of 
private R&D (cf. Table 3.2).
59 They simultaneously analyse the effects of the four earlier 
mentioned policies (i.e. fiscal incentives; public funding of private R&D; public research in 
government labs; research performed by universities) on private R&D outlays in one 
framework, using data for 17 OECD countries.  
Capron and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997) have reviewed a large number of studies 
and conclude the following: “Despite the heterogeneity of the empirical models referred to in 
the literature, which makes any comparison exercise hazardous, the balance seems to tilt 
towards the recognition of a complementary effect between the two sources of funds. However, 
there are some indications that in some industries, or in some countries, government R&D is a 
substitute for private R&D.”
60  
                                                      
54 Cornet takes 20 percent as the lower bound, and 60 percent as the upper bound for the social rate of 
return on extra R&D generated by the WBSO. We refer to Cornet (2001) for the reasoning behind taking 
these boundaries.  
55 An example of a computable general equilibrium model with R&D and R&D tax incentives is Russo 
(2004). 
56 Studies differ according to the level of aggregation (firms; industries; countries), time-period under 
consideration, type of data (cross-section; time-series), and econometric methodology.  
57 This does not imply that the remaining studies report complementarity, because another quarter of the 
studies under consideration find an insignificant relationship between public funding of R&D and private 
R&D activity. 
58 Another interesting result found by Garcia-Quevedo and David et al. is that crowding out of private 
R&D is more often found in studies for the US than in studies for other countries. 
59 This value is the average amount invested by private decision makers when they receive one dollar of 
subsidies. However, we would like to stress that the relative importance of positive spillovers and 
negative crowding out effects of public funding of R&D may differ substantially across industries, as well 
as across countries. 
60 For example, a country-level study of Capron and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (1997) finds that the 
marginal impact of public funded R&D on private R&D activity is significantly negative (i.e. 
substitution) for Canada, France and Italy, insignificant for Germany and Japan, whereas it is positive (i.e. 
complementarity) for the UK. The interested reader is referred to Capron and Van Pottelsberghe (1997) 
and Garcia-Quevedo (2004) for a comprehensive review of the results of many other empirical studies on 
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Research performed in the public sector 
An interesting question is whether the private sector benefits from publicly performed research. 
Cohen et al. (2002) find that public research positively affects industrial R&D, but that the 
magnitude of this effect varies by industry and firm size. After controlling for industry effects, 
the impact of public research on industrial R&D is greatest for larger firms as well as for start-
ups. 
However, we have seen earlier that publicly performed research consists of two categories, 
notably, research conducted in public research laboratories and university research. Relatively 
little is known about the separate effects of each of these two categories of public R&D on 
private R&D outlays. One of the notable exceptions is the earlier mentioned study of Guellec 
and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003). They find that, for the group of 17 OECD countries 
as a whole, an extra dollar of R&D conducted in government labs crowds out 44 cents of private 
R&D, whereas a dollar spent on academic research lowers private R&D expenditure by 18 cents 
(see table 3.2).
61 An important drawback of the study of Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2003) is that it does not sufficiently take into account the longer term effects of R&D 
policies, such as knowledge spillovers (cf. Venniker and Canton, 2004). For instance, it may 
take a few years before basic knowledge developed in universities spills over to firms. This 
implies that the net effect of university research on private R&D outlays may not be that 
negative, or may even be positive in the long term.  
An example of a study finding a positive effect of university research on private (industry) R&D 
is Jaffe (1989). Using US state-level data, and controlling for population and economic activity, 
Jaffe finds a positive elasticity of 0.7.
62  
Table 3.2 Effects of R&D policy on private R&D outlays
1 
  Public funding Fiscal incentives
2  Government 
labs 
University 
research 
Short-term elasticity  0.07  0.29  − 0.07  − 0.04 
Long-term elasticity  0.08  0.33  − 0.08  − 0.05 
Marginal effect of an extra dollar
3  0.70    − 0.44  − 0.18 
Notes: 
1.  Based on data on 17 OECD-countries from 1983 to 1996. 
2.  Tax outlays have been measured by an index, and should not be interpreted in monetary (dollar) terms. The 
reader is referred to Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) for an explanation of the construction 
of this index. 
3.  This is calculated as the elasticity times the ratio of the relevant government outlays and private R&D outlays 
over all 17 countries in 1997.  
Source: Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003). The table is taken from Venniker and Canton (2004). 
                                                      
61 These average marginal effects may mask potentially large international differences. As mentioned by 
Venniker and Canton (2004), the marginal effect of an extra dollar of public money in countries 
characterised by a relatively low ratio of private R&D outlays to public outlays, which is the case in the 
Netherlands for instance, will be smaller (in absolute terms).   
62 However, as mentioned by Jaffe, there are some caveats in the data used, and one cannot interpret these 
results structurally, in the sense of predicting the resulting change in industrial R&D if university research 
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3.2.3 Conclusions 
When modelling R&D in a macro-context, one should take account of: 
•  (Substantial) positive external effects of R&D (i.e. social rate of return exceeds private rate 
of return to R&D).  
•  Interactions of competition and the stock of human capital with the level and/or returns to 
R&D. 
When modelling R&D policy in a macro-context, one should take account of the following 
notions: 
•  Policy may impact upon the level of R&D activity as well as upon the rate of return to 
R&D. 
•  A whole array of different types of policies exists to impact upon R&D activity, either 
directly or more indirectly. The effects of each of these different types of interventions vary 
in terms of magnitude and character. Empirical evidence on the (relative) effectiveness of 
these different policies based on sound evaluation studies (i.e. studies with a (quasi-) 
experimental design) is scarce.  
•  Even when considering a certain type of intervention (e.g. tax credits), it is difficult to draw 
conclusions on its effectiveness. This is because R&D programs are often very specific in 
nature, and the effects of a particular program often depend on program design and 
management. Moreover, effects found for one particular intervention need not to occur 
when exactly the same intervention is carried out in another region or country, on a larger 
scale, in another time period, or in another industry (this is the concern of external validity). 
•  There may be time lags in the effects of R&D policies. For instance, public R&D may 
directly crowd out private R&D, whereas the knowledge spillovers of this public R&D to 
firms only materialise after some years. It is important to take these lag structures into 
account when modelling R&D policies in a macro-model.  
3.3  Product market competition 
In this section, we discuss the impact of competition policy. As competition is not a production 
factor, we confine ourselves to a description of the impact of competition policy on several 
important macroeconomic indicators. Table 3.3 presents a summary. The empirical evidence 
presented in the table suggests that regulatory reform has been beneficial for efficiency. Both 
level and growth effects seem to be relevant. It should be noted that it is not straightforward to 
derive welfare implications from these results. There will be a time lag between the regulatory 
reform and the efficiency gain (see Matheron and Maury (2004) for a simulation analysis to 
quantify the welfare cost of monopolistic competition in an endogenous growth framework), 
and possible adjustment costs are not taken into account. 36 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
Table 3.3 Product market liberalisation and performance 
Study  Country / period  Explanatory 
variable 
Performanc
e variable 
Effects 
found 
Method 
Emerson et al., 
1988 
EU, medium-term  Implementation of 
Single Market 
GDP +  4.1%  Simulation 
Industry 
Commission, 
1995 
Australia, long-
run 
Deregulation 
(implementation of 
the Hilmer report) 
GDP +  5.5%  Simulation 
Lipschitz et al., 
1989 
Germany, 
annually 
Deregulation GDP +  0.3%  Simulation 
Van Sinderen et 
al., 1994 
Netherlands, 
annually 
Deregulation GDP +  0.5%  Simulation 
OECD, 1997  8 OECD 
countries, long-
run 
Regulatory reform in 
electricity, air travel, 
road freight, 
telecom, and retail 
GDP   Simulation 
 US      +  0.9%   
 Japan      +  5.6%   
 Germany      +  4.9%   
 France      +  4.8%   
 UK      +  3.5%   
 Netherlands      +  3.5%   
 Spain      +  5.6%   
 Sweden      +  3.1%   
Goff, 1996  US, 1950-1992  Index of regulatory 
intensity 
GDP  − 0.9% 
(annually) 
Econometric
Koedijk and 
Kremers, 1996 
11 EU countries, 
1981-1993 
Index of strictness of 
product market 
regulation 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
Negative Descriptive 
    TFP  growth  Negative   
    Labour 
productivity 
growth 
Negative  
Gwartney and 
Lawson, 1997 
115 countries  Index of degree of 
economic freedom 
GDP per 
capita 
Positive Descriptive 
    GDP per 
capita 
growth 
Positive  
Dutz and Hayri, 
1999 
52 countries, 
1986-1995 
Index of pro-
competitive policy 
environment 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
Positive Econometric
Edwards, 1998  93 countries, 
1980-1990 
Index of openness to 
trade 
TFP growth  Positive  Econometric
Source: Ahn (2002). 
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CEPR and IFS (2003) review a number of important product market regulations and reforms at 
the level of the aggregate economy, such as: 
•  Ease of starting a new business; 
•  Trade; 
•  State involvement in the economy; 
•  Administrative burden on business. 
First, the ease of starting a new business can affect entry, and thereby competition within an 
industry (although Geroski (1995) finds that entry has only a modest effect on average price-
cost margins). Data on the ease of starting a new business are for instance available from the 
Fraser Institute and the OECD. According to the Fraser Institute index, it is relatively easy to 
start a new business in Finland and the US (respectively 8.8 and 8.4 on a 10 point scale in 
2000). The Netherlands has an index of 7.6 in the year 2000. Second, according to economic 
theory, lowering import barriers will increase the degree of competition. An important indicator 
for trade barriers is the average import tariff rate. There is little variation in tariff rates across 
EU countries, as rates were largely harmonised within the European Community. Third, CEPR 
and IFS include several aspects of government involvement in the economy, such as 
government transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, government enterprises and 
government investment as a percentage of total investment, price controls, and public 
procurement as a percentage of GDP. Finally, to proxy for the administrative burden on 
business, CEPR and IFS use the Fraser Institute index of “Time senior management spends with 
government bureaucracy”. The Netherlands performs very well on this indicator, i.e. the burden 
is considered to be low by the surveyed managers and entrepreneurs (2000 data). 
CEPR and IFS conduct a regression analysis to investigate the influence of the competition 
indicators on mark-ups. The data include 12 OECD countries over the 1985-2000 period. 
Briefly, their findings are as follows. In most regressions, mark-ups are lower when it is easier 
to start a new business and when there are less price controls, but also when average tariff rates 
are higher (which is counterintuitive). The results are economically important. For instance, the 
coefficient on “ease of starting a new business” equals about -0.021 (Table 9 in CEPR and IFS, 
2003), suggesting that competition policies that increase the index by 1 (on a 10 point scale) 
would reduce the mark-up by about 2.1 percentage points. This corresponds to about an 8% fall 
in the average mark-up over value added. 
4.  Productivity in applied macroeconomic models 
How do existing applied macroeconomic models deal with productivity and the role of human 
capital, R&D, and product market competition? The CPB models MIMIC and WORLDSCAN 
distinguish workers of different skill levels, and MIMIC also specifies a training sector for 
employees. Exogenous R&D expenditures and the role of international R&D spillovers are 
considered in the WORLDSCAN model. The intensity of product market competition in terms 
of exogenous mark-up pricing can be studied in JADE, SAFE, MIMIC, and WORLDSCAN (in 
which differentiated varieties of consumer goods are specified). ATHENA has exogenous mark-
ups, but also allows for entry and exit of firms. For our purpose interesting models used at other 
policy institutions are the LINKAGE model of the World Bank (where workers can be skilled or 
unskilled, and where mark-up pricing can be studied in combination with entry/exit of firms), 
and the MULTIMOD model of the IMF (which has been extended with R&D and R&D 
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4.1  Applied macroeconomic models 
In this chapter we review how productivity is incorporated in a number of macroeconomic 
models. The models covered are listed in table 4.1 (models in use at CPB) and table 4.2 (a 
selection of models used at other institutes). Their nature ranges from national, one-sector, 
temporal, quarterly macroeconometric models like MORKMON II of De Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB) to multi-country, multi-sector, intertemporal general-equilibrium models like LINKAGE 
of the World Bank. 
Table 4.1 Models used at CPB 
Model Description 
ATHENA  Macroeconometric model to analyse medium- and long-run sectoral 
developments in the Dutch economy (see CPB, 2005) 
GAMMA  Intertemporal applied general equilibrium model to analyse ageing in 
the Dutch economy (see Draper and Westerhout, 2002) 
JADE
a  Macroeconometric model to analyse long-run developments in Dutch economy 
(see CPB, 2003a) 
MIMIC Applied  general-equilibrium  model  to analyse structural labour market 
implications of changes in the tax and social security system 
(see Graafland et al., 2001) 
SAFE
a  Macroeconometric model to analyse short-run developments in the 
Dutch economy (see CPB, 2003b) 
WORLDSCAN Applied  general-equilibrium  model to analyse long-run developments 
in the world economy (see CPB, 1999) 
a Recently, JADE and SAFE have given birth to SAFFIER, a model suitable for short-term and long-term analysis. 
SAFFIER closely resembles its parents. 
 
Table 4.2 Models used at other institutes 
Model Description 
LINKAGE (The World Bank, 
Washington D.C.) 
Multi-country, multi-sector dynamic applied general-equilibrium 
model (see Van der Mensbrugghe, 2003) 
MESEMET (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, The Hague) 
Applied general-equilibrium model of the Dutch economy with 
endogenous technology (see Van Bergeijk et al., 1997) 
MORKMON II (De Nederlandsche 
Bank, Amsterdam) 
Macroeconometric quarterly one-sector model of the Dutch 
economy (see Fase et al., 1992)  
MULTIMOD (IMF, Washington, 
D.C.) 
World econometric model used by the IMF (see Bayoumi et al., 
1999) 
NiDEM (NIESR, London)  Macroeconometric model of the UK economy (see Hubert and 
Pain, 2001; Pain and Young, 2004) 
 
A common feature of all models considered is that productivity growth is either exogenous or, 
when it is endogenous, tends to a constant value (determined by exogenous variables and 
parameters) in the long run. However, the level of labour productivity may be the outcome of 
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The attention paid to the determinants of the level of productivity varies somewhat with the 
focus of the models; still, a general conclusion is that the subject has received scant attention so 
far. In recent years, several institutes have built experimental or special-purpose versions of 
their models that do incorporate features of the new growth theory. However, most of the 
insights gained from the recent theoretical and empirical work on economic growth must still 
find their way into the applied models. 
4.2 Human  capital 
4.2.1 CPB  Models 
The macroeconometric models ATHENA, JADE, and SAFE do not take explicit account of 
human capital. Still, in these models wage levels do differ between sectors of industry, 
reflecting differences in the composition of sectoral employment with respect to age, gender, 
and skill. The applied general-equilibrium models GAMMA, MIMIC, and WORLDSCAN do 
account for labour heterogeneity in at least one respect. 
GAMMA focuses on the impact of ageing on the economy. To that end, it disaggregates the 
(potential) labour force (persons 15-64 years of age) into fifty year classes. The age-productivity 
profile, coinciding with the age-wage profile, is exogenous and constant. Average labour 
productivity varies with shifts in the age distribution of the labour force. 
MIMIC focuses on the impact of the tax and social security system on the labour market. It 
contains a rather detailed labour supply module, distinguishing the potential labour force with 
respect to age (two classes), gender, marital status, main source of income (work or some kind 
of benefit) and - most relevant for our purpose - three skill groups, unskilled, low-skilled and 
high-skilled labour. In other parts of the model the breakdown is less detailed. For example, 
labour demand is broken down only to the three skill groups. 
In MIMIC, upon leaving the educational system (that has not been modelled) and entering the 
(potential) labour force, an age cohort has a given skill distribution. In general, the average skill 
level of the young cohort will be higher than that of the old, retiring cohort. Compared to 
models with homogeneous labour, MIMIC thus explains part of the increase of (labour) 
productivity to a rising skill level of the working population (as a result of investment in human 
capital), so that a smaller share is attributed residually to exogenous (labour-augmenting) 
technical progress. 
Moreover, the skill distribution of the age cohorts is not fixed once and for all. Unskilled and 
low-skilled workers may enrol in training programs (to improve their productivity and 
employability while staying in the same skill group) or post-initial schooling programs (to climb 
the skill ladder). As skills become obsolete at some non-zero rate, even high-skilled workers 
have an incentive to enrol in training programs (in MIMIC, they may not enrol in schooling 
programs). Net income differentials provide the incentives for training and schooling. Hence, 
changes in the progressiveness of income taxes have some impact on human capital formation, 
but only on human capital formation after the completion of initial schooling. Ultimately, a 
given change in the tax structure leads to a stable deviation from the skill distribution originally 
imported into MIMIC. 
WORLDSCAN distinguishes between two kinds of labour: high-skilled and low-skilled. The 
relative supply of these two types of labour is exogenously determined outside the model. For 
OECD-countries it is assumed that the share of high-skilled workers is constant at 50%. The 
production functions are of the nested CES-type. Both types of labour enter the production 40 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
function in the value-added nest,
63 together with capital and a fixed production factor. Technical 
progress is assumed to be TFP-enhancing, implying there are no differences in labour-
augmenting technical progress between high- and low-skilled workers. On the sectoral level, 
labour productivity can change as a result of factor substitution. On the macroeconomic level, 
labour productivity also depends on relocation of high- and low-skilled labour among sectors. 
4.2.2 Other  models 
Like other macroeconometric models for short-term forecasting and policy analysis, 
MORKMON II of DNB does not pay attention to human capital. 
Inspired by Den Butter and Wollmer (1996), Van Bergeijk et al. (1997) extend MESEM, the 
applied general-equilibrium model for the Dutch economy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
with endogenous technology in ways suggested by new growth theory to obtain MESEMET. In 
this model, value added is a Cobb-Douglas function of effective labour and effective capital. 
Effective labour itself is a CES function of ‘raw labour’ L and human capital H with conditional 
(that is, for constant quantity of effective labour) Allen partial elasticity of substitution equal to 
0.55 in the base line version of the model. Human capital is treated as a public good. It evolves 
according to 
, ln ln ln ln ln ln ln 6 5 4 3 2 1 1 i g g p p T d E d RD d RD d I d H d H d α α α α α α − + + + + = −  (4.1) 
where Ip is private investment (in physical capital), RDp is private R&D, RDg is public R&D, Eg 
is public expenditure on education, and Ti is the marginal tax rate on labour income. The first 
term represents depreciation, the second term represents a positive external effect of learning-
by-doing, and the third and fourth term represent a positive external effect of R&D-activities on 
the human-capital stock, which Van Bergeijk et al. (1997) call learning-by-designing. Naturally, 
public expenditures on education increase the stock of human capital. Finally, high marginal 
taxes discourage investment in human capital through a negative effect on the rate of return. 
The values of crucial parameters are highly uncertain, giving the researcher a wide range of 
choice. For example, compared to Van Bergeijk et al. (1997), Den Butter and Wollmer (1996) 
opt for a lower value of 0.8 for the partial elasticity of substitution between effective labour and 
effective capital, and simultaneously for a higher value of 1.25 for the (conditional) partial 
elasticity of substitution between raw labour and human capital. They find that a boost to human 
capital reduces the demand for raw labour, while Van Bergeijk et al. (1997) find that it raises 
the demand for raw labour. This divergence is for a great part due to the differing assumptions 
about the elasticities of substitution just mentioned (naturally, other differences in parameters 
and model specification play a role as well). 
LINKAGE, the applied general-equilibrium model used by the World Bank, distinguishes 
between unskilled and skilled labour. Aggregate labour is a substitute for capital in the value-
added production functions. However, the model user has the option to introduce a third skill 
group, that of highly skilled labour, to which some part of skilled labour is allotted; highly 
skilled labour is a complement to capital in the production of value added. 
                                                      
63 Value added is a Cobb-Douglas function that is a CES function with Allen partial elasticity of 
substitution equal to one. HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 41 
 
4.3  Research and development 
4.3.1 CPB  Models 
In Lejour and Nahuis (2000), the possibility of R&D spillovers was added to WORLDSCAN in 
a way that resembles the approach of Bayoumi et al. (1999) (see below). TFP-growth of a sector 
is modelled as a function of its own R&D-stock, the R&D-stock of the other sectors in the 
economy (using input-output coefficients as weights), and the trade-weighted R&D-stock of the 
foreign sectors. Lejour and Nahuis (2000) construct TFP-measures using growth accounting 
techniques, and estimate the equations for all regions and sectors using R&D data. Lejour and 
Nahuis find significant rates of return to own R&D and spillovers within the economy, and 
positive but insignificant interregional spillovers. 
These equations for TFP are used in the WORLDSCAN model. The R&D expenditures are 
assumed to be a constant proportion of value added of each sector. The model is used by Lejour 
and Nahuis (2000) in a simulation exercise to analyse the effects of trade liberalisation. They 
find that the introduction of R&D in WORLDSCAN increases the effects of trade liberalisation.  
The TFP-equations were re-estimated by Tang and Lejour (2004) and the new version of the 
model was used in CPB (2004) to analyse the relationship between the German and Dutch 
economies. Furthermore, the model was used in a study on climate change policies (Bollen, 
2004). 
4.3.2 Other  models 
MESEMET includes technology capital, the output of R&D activities, in the production 
function of value added in a similar way to human capital. Effective capital is a CES function of 
public capital and composite private capital; the latter in its turn is a CES function of physical 
capital and technology capital, which is a CES function of public and private technology capital. 
The production function thus contains three public goods, human capital, public (physical) 
capital, and public technology capital, next to three private goods. The properties of the model
64 
are highly dependent on the values of the (conditional) Allen partial elasticities of substitution at 
all levels of the production tree. Both Van Bergeijk et al. (1997) and Den Butter and Wollmer 
(1996) perform sensitivity analyses that testify to the great uncertainty surrounding the 
outcomes of their simulation exercises. 
Two foreign models particularly relevant for us are NiDEM and MULTIMOD. Special-purpose 
versions of these models have been built that incorporate some features of the new growth 
theory. These will be discussed next. 
Bayoumi et al. (1999) introduce R&D spillovers in the MULTIMOD model of IMF. Each 
country has a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
, 1 0 , ln ) 1 ( ln ln ln < < − + + = α α α L K A Y  (4.2) 
where A is total factor productivity TFP (of course, the parameters and variables differ across 
countries, and the variables differ across time, but the subscripts have been deleted). Based on 
work by Coe and Helpman (1995) and by Coe et al. (1997), Bayoumi et al. (1999) endogenise 
                                                      
64 Formally, under the assumption of cost minimisation one may derive mixed demand functions for the 
private inputs with the prices of the private inputs and of the quantities of the public inputs as arguments 
(next to the level of production); moreover, one may derive shadow-price equations for the public inputs 
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total factor productivity A by relating it to the domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks and to 
the share of imports in GDP. For small industrial countries, the following equation is used: 
, 18 . 3 ln 26 . 0 ln 08 . 0 ln m S m S A F D − ⋅ + + =φ  (4.3) 
whereφ is a country-specific constant, 
D S is the domestic R&D capital stock, 
F S is the foreign 
R&D capital stock, and m is the import share. A 1% increase in the domestic R&D capital stock 
leads to a 0.08% TFP increase. Trade acts as a carrier for knowledge spillovers and thus foreign 
R&D capital affects TFP through its interaction with the import share m. In addition, imports 
affect domestic TFP directly, the intuition being that foreign knowledge can be embodied in 
new products. The elasticities of the foreign R&D capital stock and the import share depend on 
the level of the other variable because of the interaction term. At the sample averages, the 
elasticity of TFP with respect to foreign R&D capital is about 0.08 and the elasticity with 
respect to the import share is roughly zero. Following a shock, economic growth returns to the 
same steady-state value in the long run, but adjustment can take very long indeed (eighty years). 
The R&D/GDP ratio is an exogenous variable. An increase in this ratio raises TFP, which 
boosts the return to investment in the physical capital stock and thus triggers higher 
investments. General-equilibrium effects thus reinforce partial-equilibrium effects. For example, 
raising the R&D/GDP ratio by 0.5%-point increases US output by more than 9% in the long 
run, about three quarters of which is due to productivity increases and the remainder to induced 
higher investments. 
Hubert and Pain (2001) adopt a similar approach but deviate from the work of Bayoumi et 
al. (1999) in two important respects. First, they represent the technology by a two-factor CES 
production function, with technical progress (TP) assumed to be labour augmenting at rate λ, 
over time t. Second, they add a measure of the level of activity of foreign-owned firms to the list 
of determinants of domestic technical progress. The idea that foreign direct investment is one of 
the main transmission mechanisms behind the diffusion of knowledge, both codified and tacit, 
across national borders is borne out by their estimation results on industry-level panel data for 
the UK manufacturing sector. Hubert and Pain (2000) have reported econometric evidence that 
the mechanism is also at work in the financial-services and distribution sectors of the UK 
economy. 
Based on this work, Pain and Young (2004) endogenise the level of technology in the NiDEM 
model of NIESR by relating it to the stock of foreign direct investments (SFDI). Under constant 
returns to scale, the first-order condition that the marginal product of each input should equal its 
real price can be used to derive a long-run log-linear labour demand equation of the form: 
), / ln( ) 1 ( ) / ln( t t t t P W t c Y L σ λ σ − − − =  (4.4) 
where L denotes labour demand, Y value added output, W the wage rate, P the value added 
price, and σ the elasticity of substitution. Pain and Young (2004) next replace λt by 
. ) / ln( 1 − + = t F T P SFDI TIME t λ λ λ  (4.5) 
In this specification TP will grow at a constant rate if foreign assets do. Pain and Young embed 
the long-run equilibrium relationship implied by equations (4.3) and (4.4) in a dynamic error-
correction model. They use the estimation results of Hubert and Pain (2001) in their simulation 
analyses. A 1% change in the stock of manufacturing FDI eventually raises the level of labour-
augmenting TP in the manufacturing sector by 0.32%; for the financial-services and distribution 
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In the LINKAGE model of the World Bank, technical progress is labour augmenting. There is 
no explicit role for R&D. The model does allow for the possibility that the extend to which 
some country may enjoy international knowledge spillovers is positively correlated with the 
‘openness’ of the economy as measured by the EXports/GDP ratio. The specification is 
, ) 1 ( 1 − ⋅ + + = t t t terms other λ χ λ  (4.6) 
, ) / ( η ϕ χ t t t GDP EX ⋅ =  (4.7) 
where λ is the productivity factor. The parameter φ determines the degree to which productivity 
depends on openness and is fixed in the calibration procedure by the model user. The elasticity 
η may be put equal to zero to switch the mechanism off and make productivity exogenous. 
4.4  Product market competition 
4.4.1 CPB  models 
None of the CPB models has been built with applications to competition policy in mind, so it 
causes no surprise that they contain few elements that are relevant for this purpose. GAMMA 
assumes perfect competition on product markets. In the other models, firms set prices in 
imperfectly competitive markets; in fact, markets are populated with Bertrand oligopolies or 
monopolistic competitors, as the case may be. Mark-ups are constant in JADE, SAFE, and 
MIMIC at fairly low levels; implicitly, the implied pure profits are just sufficient to compensate 
for sunk costs (which are not present explicitly). In WORLDSCAN, each sector in a region 
produces exactly one variety. Since the varieties are imperfect substitutes, sectors are able to 
charge a (constant) mark-up over their marginal costs. The number of firms (varieties) is fixed. 
ATHENA is more advanced in the description of market structure. Firms within an industry 
charge a (constant) mark-up over marginal costs, as in WORLDSCAN. The mark-up may or 
may not be sufficient to cover the fixed costs, and therefore the firms may make profits or 
losses. The number of firms then adjusts, through entry or exit, until there are no long-run 
profits. In this way, the number of firms in an industry is made endogenous. 
4.4.2 Other  models 
LINKAGE provides the user with a choice with respect to the returns to scale in production. 
They may be constant, in which case there is perfect competition on product markets. Or they 
may be increasing through the presence of fixed costs, in which case there are positive mark-ups 
of prices over marginal cost. In the latter case, the user has another choice to make: either fixed 
mark-ups go together with endogenous profits, or zero-profit conditions make the mark-ups 
endogenous (as in contestable markets). 
5. Epilogue 
This chapter presents some final thoughts with regard to the implementation of human capital, 
R&D, and product market competition in applied macroeconomic models. Such an exercise 
calls for a number of strategic choices which have to be made by the researcher. We want to 
wind up our analysis by sketching some of these strategic modelling decisions. 44 | CANTON, MINNE, NIEUWENHUIS, SMID & VAN DER STEEG 
 
Complexity: A cost-benefit analysis 
Whenever a new issue is addressed in a macroeconomic model, it becomes more complex to 
analyse and more costly to build and maintain. Such a decision whether or not to extend the 
model should therefore be based on a cost-benefit appraisal, where various implementation 
strategies can be considered. A practical approach is to add an exogenous variable whose value 
is determined separately (e.g. in a sub-model or econometric analysis). This will be easier to 
implement, but ignores interactions with other variables in the model. 
Human capital 
Let us first consider human capital in macroeconomic analysis. One needs to decide whether to 
consider exogenous or endogenous growth. It should be noticed that changes in the human 
capital stock will affect economic growth in a neoclassical growth framework during the 
transition period. These transition dynamics can be a lengthy process. In fact, the time horizon 
of forecasting will typically be shorter than the full adjustment process to the new equilibrium 
path. The dynamic properties of exogenous and endogenous growth models may therefore be 
not so different in the short-run. However, endogenous growth models typically generate non-
stationary time series for important macroeconomic variables such as production, consumption 
and investments. Another strategic choice refers to the degree of heterogeneity in the work 
force. Allowing for two or more different skill levels among employees enables the researcher 
to investigate wage inequality (and corresponding equity consequences), and to consider skill-
biased technical change (cf. Acemoglu, 2002). It also opens up the possibility to study changes 
in the fraction of skilled or unskilled workers. However, the schooling decision can also be 
investigated in a framework with a homogeneous labour force (cf. Lucas, 1988). Also, a 
complication of multiple skill levels is that the researcher needs to pick parameter estimates for 
the substitutability in production between skill levels, as well as between each skill level and the 
physical capital stock. A final example of strategic modelling decisions with regard to human 
capital is whether or not to introduce an education sector. This implies the specification of an 
education production function, linking inputs in the education process to outputs. The advantage 
of such a structural approach is internal consistency, the possibility to explore general 
equilibrium effects, and transparency. The problem here is that educational outcomes will be 
affected by a myriad of factors, such as teacher training, class size, funding system, 
competitiveness of the education market, peer effects, etc., and it is not possible to incorporate 
all these mechanisms into the education production function. 
Research and development 
The introduction of R&D in applied macroeconomic models is less straightforward than human 
capital. New knowledge appears in many guises, some in the form of embryonic scientific 
insights with a strong public good character and others in more tacit or embodied (and thereby 
rival and excludable) form. New knowledge can find its way to productive uses along several 
paths, such as via embodied knowledge in advanced machinery or through improved 
organisation of logistic processes. In macroeconomic analyses we have to try and represent the 
important facets of the R&D process, while keeping the broader economic picture and the 
technical feasibility of the model in mind. An important strategic choice is again whether one 
wants to consider exogenous or endogenous growth. In an extended version of the neoclassical 
model a la Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996), the stock of technological know-how (resulting 
from R&D investments in the past) affects the production capacity, but not the long-run growth 
potential. Changes in the R&D stock will change the equilibrium production level, and generate 
transitional dynamics until the new balanced growth path is reached. In endogenous growth 
models such as Aghion and Howitt (1992), R&D investments determine the pace of economic 
growth. Also, the researcher needs to choose how R&D affects the production capacity. There HUMAN CAPITAL, R&D AND COMPETITION IN MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS | 45 
 
are (at least) three possibilities: (i) we can introduce the knowledge stock as a separate 
production factor into the production function, (ii) we can allow for quality ladders in the 
physical capital stock, where more recent machinery embodies more state-of-the-art knowledge, 
and (iii) we could assume that research benefits firms through total factor productivity. All these 
three possibilities seem feasible, though a bit more creativity (or a lot of hard work) may be 
needed to follow the quality ladder approach in an existing macroeconomic model with only 
one type of physical capital. The first approach basically treats R&D as a private commodity, in 
a similar fashion as the physical capital stock. The third approach has the advantage that it is 
rather straightforward and flexible. And by imposing a connection between TFP and R&D, we 
could study issues connected to adoption of existing technologies (R&D helps firms to move 
towards the technological frontier), as well as endogenous growth processes in a Schumpeterian 
style (R&D shifts the technological frontier outwards). A final thought here is whether or not to 
specify the research sector. Scientists and engineers are the major input in the research process, 
and a straightforward modelling assumption would be that researchers are the only input (as in 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Incorporation of the research sector allows us to study labour market 
effects from changes in research activity, and this can be interesting because public programs to 
support R&D often take the form of subsidies or tax benefits to reduce the labour costs of 
researchers. 
Competition 
Finally we present some thoughts about how competition and competition policy can be dealt 
with in macroeconomic analysis. As we have seen, the macroeconomic impact of competition 
can be studied in both exogenous and endogenous growth models. An interesting aspect of 
competition in Schumpeterian growth models such as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) is that 
(dynamic) competition and economic growth are intimately intertwined: competition manifests 
itself in creative destruction of incumbent firms, and the innovating firm becomes the new 
market leader. A somewhat simplified version of this mechanism can be studied in an extended 
neoclassical growth model with (i) inclusion of R&D, while R&D is linked to some indicator of 
the competition intensity, or (ii) TFP linked to competition. Second, how should we deal with 
the notion that product market competition is not perfect? As we have discussed in Section 2.4.1 
we could consider a market with only a few firms, while these firms compete with each other 
through strategic interaction (i.e. Bertrand or Cournot competition). An alternative is found in 
the Dixit-Stiglitz approach, where firms compete monopolistically (without strategic 
interaction), and consumers have a taste for variety. In equilibrium, firms are symmetric and 
mark-ups identical. A short-cut could be to introduce mark-up pricing, and link the mark-up to 
the intensity of competition and perhaps a set of other institutional characteristics such as entry 
barriers and the administrative burden for companies. Following the work of Boone (2000a, 
2000b) and Aghion and Howitt (2005), competition will be intertwined with efficiency 
differences across firms in the same industry. This would allow us to study the dynamics of 
catching-up towards the most efficient firms. Finally, intensified competition may imply that 
factors of production need to be reallocated. Moving people to new jobs and capital to new 
firms or branches is costly. For workers these costs are for instance unemployment allowances 
during the period of job switching and training costs. Also the capital stock is not flexible due to 
rigidities of old vintages. The period of adjustment is often rather long, and adjustment costs 
precede the economic benefits. Switching costs for consumers can also be seen as costs of more 
competition. | 46 
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